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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
WHY TENURE? AN OPTIMAL CONTRACT PERSPECTIVE  
by 
Zhengzheng Qian 
Florida International University, 2017 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Jesse Bull, Major Professor 
In academia, after a reasonable probationary period of service and upon the achievement 
of tenure, the recipients of tenure are entitled to a continuing appointment at an institution 
without mandatory retirement and with only limited grounds for revocation. Advocates of 
tenure argued that it protected academic freedom through economic security. Opponents 
of tenure argued that it fostered inefficient and unproductive behavior. This dissertation 
developed a framework for examining academic tenure in U.S. economics departments. I 
constructed a dataset of tenured U.S. economics professors who were Ph.D. recipients 
between 1990 and 2006 and tracked their publications. In the first chapter, based on 
difference-in-difference analysis I found that tenure has a direct effect on the choice of 
research direction/focus. In general, tenured groups had a higher degree of specialization 
than non-tenured groups after they received tenure. For some tenured groups, even if their 
extent of specialization decreased after tenure, when I controlled for unobserved 
heterogeneity, tenure still had a positive effect on extent of specialization. This result 
suggested that the job security provided by tenure made tenured faculty more narrowly 
v 
 
focused on their research. Using path analysis in the second chapter, my finding suggested 
that the extent of specialization was one of the key factors which might influence a 
scholar’s productivity. In addition, the extent of specialization helped explain gender 
differences in academic productivity. The results revealed that the effect of gender on 
productivity through the degree of specialization was more notable among older 
generations, and in most fields, gender differences in extent of research specialization 
mediated gender difference in research performance; although there were some fields in 
which gender difference in the research process could not explain gender difference in 
research performance. The third chapter expanded our understanding of advancement in 
academics by exploring a new dimension of inquiry: whether the extent of specialization 
in scholars’ research programs improved promotion prospects. Using discrete event 
analysis, my research showed that the extent of research specialization contributed to career 
acceleration, although gender difference on the prospects of advancement in academics 
was not significant. 
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1 PREFACE 
There are many explanations for why universities have a tenure system.  From an 
economic viewpoint the possibility that a tenure system helps to solve a contracting 
problem between a faculty member and a university is a compelling reason for tenure 
contracts to be used.  
The feature of a potential contracting problem I focus on deals with specialization 
in research.  One might imagine that specialization in a relatively narrow research area 
might increase a faculty member’s chances of big discoveries or publication in top journals.  
It’s possible that with an employment-at-will contract, the faculty member’s incentives to 
specialize may not be aligned with those of the university.  One reason may be that the 
faculty member may wish to be more diversified in his/her areas of expertise to facilitate a 
job search should it become necessary.   
By providing security of employment once a tenured position is attained, a tenure 
system may provide the faculty member the incentive to specialize, both pre and post tenure.  
The pre-tenure argument would be that specialization increases a faculty member’s chances 
of successful research and increases her chances of earning tenure.  Post-tenure, the 
security of employment may reduce the incentive for a faculty member to diversify 
research directions.  Further, if there is a learning aspect associated with the pre-tenure 
activity, specialization pre-tenure may encourage specialization post-tenure.  
This dissertation explores whether there is empirical evidence to support this type 
of explanation in the discipline of economics. Additionally, it provides an empirical 
investigation of the academic labor market for economists.  In particular, my work here 
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seeks to better understand the relationship between tenure, promotion, specialization, and 
research productivity in economics.   
In Chapter 2, I present sample and related variables. 
In Chapter 3, I study the effects of tenure on specialization. With job security, it 
might be possible for faculty to devote more time to fundamental research that might lead 
to “big discoveries”, and I believe most universities value research that results in “big 
discoveries,” which shape a research area, and publications in top journals much more than 
they do a larger quantity of uninfluential publications in low-ranked journals. 
In Chapter 4, I study the relationship between specialization and research 
productivity.  As economics research is becoming more complex, the productivity gains 
realized from specializing seem intuitive. Gender difference in terms of research 
specialization contributes to gender difference in research productivity. 
In Chapter 5, I explore the role of specialization in promotion.  This also includes 
studying the effects of specialization on post-tenure promotion/promotion to full professor. 
A scholar’s career benefits from repeatedly engaging in research on the same substantive 
topic.  
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2 DATA 
This section provides a detailed description of the process through which the data 
used in the econometric analysis were assembled.  In order, I describe (i) how I collected 
the whole sample; (ii) how to measure the extent of specialization; and (iii) how to measure 
productivity.  
2.1 Sample 
The economists included in the main dataset are the faculty from one of the top 86 
Economics departments in the United States who received their doctorates between 1990 
and 2006.  This list of the top 86 U.S. Economics departments is according to RePEC 
(Research Papers in Economics) Economics department ranking1. This dataset contains 
699 economists. Among them, 137 are female economists and 562 are male.  
I used individual CVs to obtain information about where and when an individual 
received his/her doctoral degree, his/her employment history, and his/her primary and 
secondary fields and used first names and Internet searches, if necessary, to determine each 
individual’s gender. I also used this information to obtain when and where an individual 
had been guaranteed tenure. I used department websites to find the current departmental 
position, such as associate or full professor.  
Then, for each economist, I tracked his/her journal publications and constructed a 
complete record of their publications for the years from 1990 to 2014. The data were 
collected from the American Economic Association’s electronic bibliography: EconLit.  
                                                            
1 List of Economics departments used in sample are found in Appendix A. Further details may be found at: 
https://ideas.repec.org/top/top.usecondept.html 
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EconLit annually indexes the articles published in over 1000 journals across all disciplines 
within economics. There are nearly 1.3 million records to date. Coverage of articles reaches 
as far back as 1886. Although this database includes several different types of documents 
(peer-reviewed journal articles, working papers from leading universities, replies, 
obituaries, letters to the editor, reviews, etc.), only peer-reviewed journal articles were 
considered here, since these articles are generally regarded as original research (Moed 1996) 
and represent rigorous quality. By entering economists’ names, I accessed all of their 
refereed journal articles. For each article, I collected the journal title, co-author names, and 
published date.   
Most importantly for this study, I collected the JEL (Journal of Economics 
Literature classification system) codes. The JEL classification system is specifically 
subdivided into 20 fields and 841 subfields. Each subfield is denoted by a letter and a two-
digit number2. I used the JEL codes in most detailed division, corresponding to two-digit 
JEL codes from the article, so as to categorize each article. Most articles use two or three 
JEL codes. The number is up to seven per article in my dataset. For articles having any 
missing information, I referred to the individual’s CV and Internet searches for additional 
information. For example, if an article has more than three authors, EconLit might only 
report the first author’s name. Pooling all years, the dataset contains 11230 peer-review 
articles. 
                                                            
2 Further detail may be accessed at: http://www.aeaweb.org/journal/jel_class_system.html 
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2.2 Measure of Specialization 
I used the Ellison-Glaeser (EG) concentration index to measure the extent of 
specialization. The Ellison-Glaeser index was introduced by Ellison (2000) to find the 
possible account for slowdowns in the economics publishing process. The Ellison-Glaeser 
index was originally adopted from Ellison and Glaeser’s (1994) paper, which first proposed 
to measure geographic concentration. Ellison (2000) used the index to measure the degree 
to which economists are specialized across the main fields of economics. 
The Ellison-Glaeser index of the extent of specialization for economist ݅ can be 
described using: 
ߛ௜ ൌ െ 1௜ܰ െ 1 ൅
௜ܰ
௜ܰ െ 1෍൫ݏ௜௙ െ ݔ௙൯
ଶ/ሺ1 െ෍ݔ௙ଶሻ
௙௙
 
Suppose that a set of economics papers can be classified as belonging to one of ܨ 
fields indexed by ݂ ൌ 1, 2, … , ܨ.  ௜ܰ is the number of papers written by economist ݅.  ௜ܵ௙ 
is the share of economist ݅ᇱs papers in field ݂, and ݔ௙ is the fraction of all publications that 
are in field ݂.  
As pointed out by Ellison (2000), under certain assumptions, the expected value of 
this index is unaffected by the number of papers by an author observed and by the number 
and size of the fields used in the breakdown. These two characteristics of the Ellison-
Glaeser index make it a better candidate in the present research, since, for each group, the 
number of faculty in that group is small and so will be their corresponding publications.  
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I first classified articles based the most detailed JEL codes for 20 subcategories. 
For articles that contain JEL codes that seem to belong to different fields, I used rules based 
on the title keywords, both article and journal. And, in some cases, I assigned fields based 
on paper-by-paper judgements. In the minor subcategories, there might be a very small 
(and sometimes nonexistent) sample of economists and corresponding publications. Hence, 
I aggregated articles to one of ten fields: Economic History and Thought (EHT), 
Econometrics (EM), Microeconomic Theory (MICRO), Labor and Consumer Economics 
(LCE), Industry Organization/ Business Economics (IO/BE), Public Economics (PE), 
Macroeconomics (MACRO), Trade and Development (TD), Financial Economics (FE) and 
Resource and Agricultural Economics (RAE). The method used to aggregate subcategories 
is taken from econphd.net3 and the precise definitions of fields in terms of associated JEL 
codes is given in Appendix 2.  
2.3 Measure of Productivity 
I used journal articles as a measure of productivity. Although peer-reviewed 
publications is not equivalent to research productivity, it is a reliable indicator and is used 
most often in the literature (Fox 1989; Xie & Shauman 1998). For example, books might 
be an addition to an economist’s reputation, but lack of an objective evaluation method 
makes it nearly impossible to evaluate the heterogeneity of book quality (Neary et al. 2003). 
In addition, policymakers and universities increasingly emphasize peer-reviewed 
publications and the performance indicators based on it (de Jong et al. 2011).  
                                                            
3 Detailed information may be found at: http://econphd.econwiki.com/journals.htm, at the bottom of each 
page. 
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One way to measure journal article productivity is to use raw counts of publications, 
which has been used in many studies (Fox 1983; Fox & Faver 1984; Xie & Shauman 1998; 
Zainab 1999; Nakhaie 2002; Leahey 2006; Hunter & Leahey 2010; Mairesse & Pezzoni 
2015). However, raw counts of publications do not take into account the variation in the 
quality of those publications or the number of pages or authors, so I took into account both 
the quality and pages of the publications. I used the journal rankings and journal factor 
from the RePEc/IDEAS4 to control for the quality of a person’s publications. It contains 
about 1559 current journals and up to 1777 titles if one includes the journals that are no 
longer referenced or renamed. I chose to take all journals and follow the method used by 
Conley, Crucini, Driskill and ONder (2013) to convert journal factors into Quarterly 
Journal of Economics (QJE) equivalence, which means I express the quality of each journal 
as a fraction of QJE quality and use these weights in calculating numbers of QJE equivalent 
publications and QJE equivalent pages in the analysis. I then adjusted the weight of all 
journals accordingly. However, I assigned any journal ranks beyond 1531 a score of 0.0001, 
as the journal rank 1531 already has a very small value of 0.0001 and the journals ranking 
beyond 1531 have an even lower score. The reason I included all journals is that I think 
even papers not published in top-ranked journals still undergo a widely accepted process 
of peer review, which is the essence of quality control.  This results in the highest quality 
journal, QJE, receiving a score of 1, and the lowest 0.0001. I mainly used QJE equivalent 
publications for the following analysis. QJE equivalent pages and raw counts will be 
applied in a robustness check.  
                                                            
4 More details may be accessed at: https://ideas.repec.org/top/top.journals.all.html 
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By assigning each publication the score of journal quality, I calculated the number 
of QJE equivalent publications for article ݅ in journal ݆: 
QJE	publications௜௝ ൌ ሺ݆݋ݑݎ݈݊ܽ	ݏܿ݋ݎ݁ሻ௝ሺܽݑݐ݄݋ݎݏሻ௜  
The number of QJE equivalent pages for article ݅ in journal ݆ is: 
QJE	pages௜௝ ൌ ሺݎܽݓ	݌ܽ݃݁ݏሻ௜ሺ݆݋ݑݎ݈݊ܽ	ݏܿ݋ݎ݁ሻ௝ሺܽݑݐ݄݋ݎݏሻ௜  
2.4 Other Related Variables 
Department prestige of PhD-granting institutions is measured using RePEC US 
Economics department ranking in 2014. A few studies have evaluated Economics 
departments using their own constructed journal ranking to measure the quality of 
publication for sampled faculty. This might result in inconsistencies in data and methods 
used in analyses. In this study, since I used the journal rankings and journal factor from the 
RePEc to measure the quality of a person’s publications, RePEC US Economics 
department ranking will be the ideal choice to score Economics departments. A lower value 
indicates more prestigious institutions.  
I also observed the department prestige of current employing institutions. Scores 
were measured by the same RePEC US Economics department ranking as for department 
prestige of PhD-granting institution. Long et al. (1993) showed that the more prestigious 
the program, the more competitive the promotion process. Additionally, Ginther and Kahn 
(2004) found that, as the prestige of the institution increases, so does a male’s advantage 
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over a female in earning tenure. Hence, the prestige of current employing institutions 
should be considered when I analyzed advancement in the academy. 
Number of previous academic appointments indicates the number of departments 
in which scholars have held academic positions before the current employment position. 
Changing departments often results in at least a partial resetting of the tenure clock (Leahey, 
2008). Studies show that changing institutions before promotion decreases the odds of 
obtaining tenure in a given year (Rosenfeld & Jones 1986; Hurlbert & Rosenfeld 1992). 
Thus, it is important to account for previous moves among departments.  
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3 TENURE’S EFFECT ON SPECIALIZATION 
3.1 Introduction 
          There has been much discussion of tenure. Should it be retained as it is? Should it be 
reformed? Or should it be eliminated completely? Proponents of tenure argue that it 
guarantees the freedom of scholars to produce research and teach against prevailing 
orthodoxies, political landscapes, and fashionable issues (Stergiou & Machias 2015). In 
addition, tenure is necessary for the academic labor market to function. With the security 
provided by tenure, existing faculty will have the necessary incentive to hire high-quality 
scholars (Dnes & Garoupa 2005), and, without that, existing faculty might hire only 
candidates weaker than themselves (Carmichael 1988; Siow 1998). In contrast, opponents 
of tenure argue that tenure fosters mediocrity by making scholars inefficient and 
unproductive (Lewis 1980). An example of tenure’s deleterious effects on its recipients is 
that some professors will stop writing altogether once they receive tenure. A negative 
correlation between scholars’ productivity and career age has been found across different 
disciplines (Levin & Stephan 1991; Oster & Hamermesh 1998).  
         In this study, I regard tenure as a mechanism of employment and discuss its possible 
merits. Previous studies have shown that tenure provides the necessary incentive for 
scholars to engage in highly specialized academic work (McPherson & Winston 1983).  
My interest is in exploring whether tenure will promote more specialized work for tenured 
scholars compared to non-tenured scholars. Specifically, I try to find out how tenure affects 
the extent of research specialization whereby faculty research productivity might be 
influenced. Do tenured faculty differ in the extent of specialization from their pre-tenured 
counterparts? If so, along which dimensions do these differences occur and to what extent?  
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            According to Leahey (2006), research institutions recognize the link between 
specialization and research performance and hope to recruit scholars “who have narrowly 
worked for 6-8 years to get tenure”.  In the context of my study, specializing allows scholars 
to master related literature and become familiar with important developments in that 
specific field. This makes successive papers on that topic easier to write, thereby increasing 
the likelihood of publishing. However, in academia, the lengthy probation period, normally 
six to seven years, sometimes eight years, is a costly opportunity for the scholar who has 
been denied tenure and ends up with a job outside academe. It is quite likely that a young 
scholar might choose a strategy to work relative broadly to land another position at another 
institution in academia. Hence, it will be important to study whether prospects/granting of 
tenure will have an influence on one’s research choice.  
             I utilize empirical methods to find the actual consequence of tenure on individuals, 
especially on an individual’s extent of research specialization. I accept the current 
institutional framework of tenure as a given and examine to what extent faculty specialize 
both before and after tenure. I constructed a unique dataset of scholars in economics who 
are PhD recipients between 1996 and 2006. I documented their research production, mainly 
peer-reviewed journal publications, three years before tenure and three/four years after 
tenure. For each publication, I recorded its JEL codes. Later, these JEL codes will be used 
to evaluate to what degree scholars specialize. I then observed the extent of specialization 
before and after receiving tenure. I constructed the extent of specialization as an indicator 
of an individual’s degree of specialization and academic marketability. A higher value of 
the extent of specialization indicated scholars restricting their research to limited topics, 
12 
 
and their research lacks higher marketability. I predict that the security provided by tenure 
decreases the need for marketability and helps scholars become more focused. 
One significant hurdle must be overcome in order to estimate the impact of tenure: 
constructing the counterfactual outcome that represents what would have happened in its 
absence. I need to identify a group of faculty who are appropriate controls for the faculty 
who have been tenured.  One choice for the control group is faculty from the non-tenure 
track. However, given the high level of publishing exhibited by tenured faculty at the time 
of their appointment, a sample of non-tenure track faculty (e.g., clinical, research, adjunct 
faculty) with a similar career age would not be appropriate, since, in most cases, the 
principal duty for non-tenure-track faculty is not research. This will bring about the so-
called ‘Ashenfelter dip’(Ashenfelter 1978; Chay et al. 2005). Individuals are self-selected 
into different groups. Scholars choose a non-tenure track position because, at the beginning 
of their career, they are already low in their research productivity. The second choice is to 
compare faculty from institutions that provided tenure previously and later abolished it.  
Some universities or colleges have abolished their tenure system (McKenzie 1996). 
However, in most cases, these institutions are not research institutions, and the number of 
faculty affected is limited. If the goal is to analyze the effect of tenure on a scholar’s 
research productivity, small institutions that are not research oriented might not be 
appropriate. Due to the lack of a plausible source of faculty who work under a contract 
severed as a variation for tenure mechanism that also research oriented and the need to 
avoid  ‘Ashenfelter dip’,  I have to carefully construct a control group. I will describe how 
I constructed the control group in the following section. The results provide support for the 
hypothesis that tenure improves the extent of specialization in most groups, and, in the 
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cases that it does not, it will prevent the extent of specialization of the tenured group from 
decreasing too much. 
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. In the next section 3.2, I describe the 
construction of the treatment/tenured and control/non-tenured groups for analysis.  Section 
3.3 lays out the econometric methodology. Section 3.4 discusses the results of the analysis. 
Section 3.5 concludes.  
3.2 Definition of treatment/tenured and control/non-tenured groups 
This section provides a detailed description of the process through which I construct 
the sets of treatment and control faculty.  
The treatment sample contains faculty who obtained tenure between 1996 and 2009. 
Starting from 1996, I divided tenured faculty in the sample into sixteen groups based on 
the year they were guaranteed tenure: 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 
2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009. For each tenured group, I collected their publication 
data for three years before they received tenure and three or four years after they received 
tenure. Then I calculated the index of extent of specialization utilizing JEL codes of each 
article. For example, for the 1996 group, I recorded pre-tenure productivity as articles 
published in the years 1993, 1994, and 1995. If a scholar received tenure in 1996, articles 
published in 1996 were considered post-tenure production. The extent of specialization of 
the post-tenure period were based on three- or four-year intervals. Using the 1996 group as 
an example again, the three-year extent of specialization after tenure was calculated based 
on articles published in 1996, 1997, and 1998 or in 1997, 1998, and 1999. Publications 
from 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999 were used to obtain a four-year extent of specialization.   
14 
 
In the absence of comparable faculty who work with other contracts, we must create 
viable control groups. The main challenge is that tenured faculty have a well record of 
publication which are necessary to calculate the extent of specialization. Controls should 
not only be well matched with tenured faculty in terms of career age, gender, rankings of 
graduation granting institution and current department, current position and employment 
histories, but their extent of specialization should also be comparable at beginning of 
observation.  Faculty who are in our control groups are those who have started their 
academic career before the observation of tenured groups begin and who have not yet 
received tenure at the end of observation. For example, in order to construct the control 
group for the 1996 group with four-year post tenure observations, we select faculty who 
are on tenure-track and have graduated and started his/her research before 1993 and have 
not obtained tenure until 1999. All other control groups are constructed accordingly.  
3.3 Method—difference-in-difference (DID) analysis 
As mentioned previously, a major concern is that faculty who are on a tenure track 
could be different from faculty who do not, and these differences may be correlated with 
extent of specialization. I find that unobservable characteristics may confound the 
correlation between tenure and the extent of specialization, such as those that vary across 
faculty but are fixed over time. For example, male scholars might limit their research to 
fewer fields and have a higher probability to get promotion compared to female economists. 
Moreover, scholars who graduate from departments with higher ranking are more likely to 
find research positions, leading them to become more focused in one field rather than doing 
multiple topics for better job market results. Also, with more rigorous training from highly 
ranked departments, scholars have a higher probability to survive the probation period 
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compared to others. Thus, when choosing a possible method to do the analysis, I 
determined that the question is how to control possible differences between the scholars 
who are tenured and who are not. When there exists possible time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity, a common method is to use panel data and apply difference-in-difference 
models. 
Difference-in-difference models compare the differences in the change of the extent 
of specialization between the treatment group and control group, which, in this study, are 
the tenured group and non-tenured group, before and after the treatment.  By comparing 
changes of the outcomes, I am able to control for observed and unobserved time-invariant 
group characteristics that might be related to both tenure decision and extent of 
specialization. The change in extent of specialization in the non-tenured group is what 
would happen to the tenured group if they had not received tenure. The changes in extent 
of specialization in the tenured group controls for fixed characteristics, and the changes in 
the non-tenured group controls for time-varying factors that are common to both tenured 
and non-tenured groups.   
The null hypothesis of this study is that tenure has no effect on an individual’s 
research specialization. Put another way, no matter what incentives and abilities a scholar 
has, tenure does not affect it. If the null hypothesis holds, this does not mean that the extent 
of specialization will be the same before and after tenure. Scholars may become more or 
less specialized after tenure, but it is attributed to other factors. If I could reject the null 
hypothesis, then I could say that tenure has an effect on the extent of specialization. The 
difference-in-difference (DID) estimator is given by: 
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ܦܫܦ ൌ ܧሾ ଵܻଵሿ െ ܧሾ ଵܻ଴ሿ െ ሺܧሾ ଴ܻଵሿ െ ܧሾ ଴ܻ଴ሿሻ  (1) 
An appropriate way to obtain (1) is to estimate the following two-way fixed-effect 
linear regression model: 
௜ܻ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ ௜ܶ ൅ ߛݐ௧ ൅ ߜሺ ௜ܶ ∗ ݐ௧ሻ ൅ ߳ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧    (2) 
Where ௜ܻ௧ is the extent of specialization for scholar ݅ at time ݐ and ௜ܺ௧ is the vector 
of control variables for scholar ݅ at time ݐ.  Tenure status is indicated by ௜ܶ ൌ 0,1 where 0 
indicates scholars who do not receive treatment, i.e. the non-tenured group, and 1 indicates 
scholars who do receive tenure treatment, i.e. the tenured group. Two time periods are 
indicated by ݐ௧ ൌ 0,1 where 0 indicates the three-year period before the tenured groups 
receive tenure, and 1 indicates the three-/four-year period after the tenured groups receive 
tenure. ߙ  is the constant term. ߚ  accounts for the average difference between tenured 
groups and non-tenured groups. ߛ is the time trend common to tenured and non-tenured 
groups. ߜ is the true effect of tenure.  
3.4 Data summary and model results  
3.4.1 Data summary 
Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 summarize the means for key variables in the dataset, 
averaged over each subset for each variable three-years before tenure. They show that the 
gender ratios are generally similar across different groups, with few exceptions. Male 
economists dominate most groups. The tenured group in 1998 has no female economists. 
However, in contrast, the non-tenured groups in 1997 and 1998 have the largest gender 
ratio, which is 0.29. The ratio among other groups varies from 0.10 to 0.26.  Differences 
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are significant for group 1998. Tenured groups do not consistently have more or less female 
economists than non-tenured groups.  
While the extent of specializations is generally similar between tenured and non-
tenured faculty across different groups before tenure, three groups show significant 
difference between non-tenured groups and tenured groups. They are groups in year 1997, 
1998 and 2000. This suggests that scholars from these tenured groups might have already 
limited their research to fewer topics than non-tenured groups before they receive their 
tenure. Hence, these groups are excluded from difference-in-difference analysis. Among 
the remaining groups, group 1996 has the highest degree of specialization, which is 0.76, 
and group 2009 is least specialized at 0.63. 
Economists from the tenured groups have more publications than non-tenured 
groups in all groups. However, when I converted publication numbers into QJE equivalent 
quality, both tenured and non-tenured groups have very similar averages in different years. 
The only exception is group 2001, wherein the tenured group has significantly higher 
quality than the non-tenured group. The tenured group in 1996 has the highest publication 
quality, which is 0.34. For both department rankings, all groups have consistent values, 
although I found that economists in the dataset all hold positions at lower-ranked 
departments compared to the rankings of their graduate departments. 
Overall, tenured and non-tenured groups show similar means for key variables 
before the tenured groups received tenure. Most tenured and non-tenured groups have 
statistically indistinguishable characteristics.  
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3.4.2 Difference-in difference analysis 
In the following, the difference-in-difference analysis will focus on groups 1996, 
1999, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009. As noted in Table 3.1 
and Table 3.2, the specialization levels for all these groups are slightly different at the 
beginning of observation, but none of them is statistically significant. Table 3.3, Table 3.4, 
Table 3.6, Table 3.7, Table 3.9, and Table 3.10 summarize the levels and changes in extent 
of specialization per scholars for the above groups. The values of the extent of 
specialization before tenure are based on publication data from three years before tenure, 
not including tenure year. The main difference between the tables is the publication data 
used to calculate the extent of specialization after tenure. I present three different ways to 
check changes. Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 show the changes of the extent of specialization 
between three years before tenure and the first three years after tenure, which is Method 1. 
Table 3.6, Table 3.7, Table 3.9 and Table 3.10 present Method 2 and Method 3. Method 2 
calculates the changes between three years before tenure and the second, third and fourth 
year after tenure. Meanwhile, the changes in Table 3.9 and Table 3.10 are from a 
comparison between three years before tenure and the first four years after tenure. This is 
Method 3.  
Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 summarize the levels and changes in the extent of 
specialization per scholars with Method 1.  As noted in the tables, the specialization levels 
for all these groups are slightly different at the beginning of observation, but none of them 
is statistically significant. For groups 1996, 1999, 2001, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007, the 
specialization levels are larger for tenured groups before scholars in tenured groups 
received tenure. It is smaller for tenured groups in groups 2002, 2003, and 2009.  
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Three years after the tenured groups received tenure, most non-tenured groups have 
lower or unchanged level of specialization than the beginning observation period except 
group 2005. For groups 1996, 1999, 2002, 2003, and 2004, economists from tenured groups 
have an increased specialization level after they are granted tenue, while, for groups 2001, 
2005, 2006, 2007, and 2009, the extent of specialization decrease after tenure. With the 
above changes, I find that, three years after tenure, although the extent of specialization 
remains slightly different between tenured and non-tenured groups, the tenured group in 
1999 has a significantly higher level of specialization than the non-tenured group. The 
relative rise (the difference-in-difference of the “tenure treatment”) is positive across all 
groups except for group 2005. In addition, the difference-in-difference estimates for group 
2003 is significantly different from zero.  
Multiple regression results in Table 3.5 suggest that tenure effects on the extent of 
specialization are reasonably robust to specification. The entries in Table 3.5 are regression 
coefficients for  ߜ  from equation (2), with or without control variables or with different 
control variables.  First, I estimate equation (2) without any control variables. The estimates 
in column (i) in Table 3.5 are comparable to the simple difference-in-difference of the 
extent of specialization changes in column (iii), row 4, 7 and so on of Table 3.3 and Table 
3.4.  Similar to previous calculations, the effects of tenure on the extent of specialization 
are positive, except groups 2001 and 2005. Tenure has significantly positive effects on 
economists’ choice of research field. Model 2 in column (ii) introduces a set of three control 
variables: gender, ranking of graduate department and current employing department 
during the observation. The effects remain the same for most groups. Model 3 in column 
(iii), in addition to the three control variables used in the second model, includes previous 
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working experience, more specifically, how many different departments the economist has 
worked in before he/she obtained a position at the current department.  The effects still 
remain the same as model 2.  
Table 3.6, Table 3.7, and Table 3.8 present the levels and changes in extent of 
specialization and model regression results for Method 2. Results are mostly similar to 
Method 1 with a few difference. Unlike result from Method 1, level of specialization for 
non-tenured group 2005 remains unchanged. Tenured group 1996 has a decreased level of 
specialization. In addition to tenured group 1999, tenured group 2002 also has a 
significantly higher level of specialization than the non-tenured group in Method 2. 
Moreover, the difference-in-difference estimates in group 2002, not group 2003, are 
significantly different from zero. Regression results from three models are mostly similar 
to Method 1 except for groups 1996, 2002 and 2003. For group 1996, tenure’s effect on 
economists’ choice of fields to work changes from positive in Method 1 to negative in 
Method 2. Economists from group 2002 have a significantly more limited number of fields 
to conduct research after they obtain tenure. Tenure still has a positive effect on the choice 
of topics for economists in group 2003, although the effect is not as significant as in Method 
1.  
Table 3.9, Table 3.10, and Table 3.11 present the levels and changes in extent of 
specialization and model regression results for Method 3. Four years after tenured groups 
receive tenure, the non-tenured group with increased rather than decreased level of 
specialization is group 1996, not group 2005 as in Method 1. In addition, only tenured 
groups from groups 2001 and 2005 have lower levels of specialization after tenure. All 
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other groups have higher or unchanged levels after tenure in Method 3. Besides tenured 
group from group 1999, the tenured group from group 2003 has a significantly higher level 
of specialization than non-tenured group. All others remain the same as Method 1. 
Regression results are similar to Method 1.  
3.5 Conclusion 
In this article, I examine the impact of incentives embodied in tenure mechanisms 
on the extent of specialization. I find that being tenured, which awards job security, leads 
to more narrowed research compared to non-tenured faculty who are still under the pressure 
of job security. With the security provided by tenure, people might pay less attention to 
their marketability and focus more on limited topics. This effect is also consistent across 
groups in different time periods. 
My findings are important, as they demonstrate the impact of tenure as positive on 
the extent of specialization. This has important implications for the organization of both 
public and private research universities, since previous studies have shown that research 
productivity is positively related to extent of specialization. Providing tenure to research 
faculty will make them limit their research to a few topics, producing a higher productivity 
rate.  
There are a few limitations to this research. First, I limited the measure of 
specialization based on publications from peer-reviewed journals. I provided reasons for 
this objective approach earlier in the article, but omitting working papers and books might 
yield biased results. Working papers are a portion of a scholar’s productivity. Some 
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working papers never get published, but they contribute to a scholar’s research focus.5 So 
are books. Adding a book to one’s productivity, even if after converting it into comparable 
pages with journal publications, could influence their productivity. 
Second, it is vital to recognize that the results are not based on a controlled 
randomized trial. Although I carefully constructed control/non-tenured groups, before 
finalizing the results, comparison should be repeated with different groups under different 
constructions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
5 There are a few well-known examples of influential working papers that were eventually published many 
years after they were first circulated as working papers, such as Maskin (1977), which was eventually 
published in 2008. 
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Table 3.1: Means of Gender, Extent of Specialization and Publication Quantity 
Year N1 Gender  Extent of Specialization Publication Quantity  
 T2 NT3 T NT p T NT p T NT p 
1996 19 25 0.18 
(0.39) 
0.22 
(0.44) 
0.79 0.76 
(0.12) 
0.74 
(0.12) 
0.69 2.70 
(1.45) 
1.89 
(1.05) 
0.15 
1997 18 41 0.17 
(0.38) 
0.27 
(0.46) 
0.50 0.78 
(0.09) 
0.63 
(0.16) 
0.00*** 3.06 
(1.92) 
1.47 
(0.83) 
0.00***
1998 24 45 0.00 
(0.38) 
0.33 
(0.49) 
0.00*** 0.81 
(0.10) 
0.67 
(0.14) 
0.00*** 3.52 
(2.14) 
1.47 
(0.64) 
0.00***
1999 17 47 0.18 
(0.39) 
0.25 
(0.44) 
0.59 0.75 
(0.12) 
0.71 
(0.13) 
0.29 3.41 
(2.50) 
1.87 
(1.03) 
0.00** 
2000 21 53 0.14 
(0.36) 
0.21 
(0.41) 
0.58 0.76 
(0.08) 
0.68 
(0.16) 
0.04** 3.90 
(1.79) 
1.92 
(1.18) 
0.00***
2001 25 60 0.24 
(0.44) 
0.21 
(0.41) 
0.80 
 
0.71 
(0.15) 
0.70 
(0.15) 
0.83 3.04 
(1.72) 
1.79 
(0.88) 
0.00***
2002 18 61 0.25 
(0.44) 
0.23 
(0.43) 
0.89 0.67 
(0.17) 
0.70 
(0.10) 
0.58 3.19 
(2.00) 
1.65 
(0.98) 
0.00***
2003 28 55 0.19 
(0.40) 
0.15 
(0.37) 
0.77 
 
0.66 
(0.17) 
0.70 
(0.11) 
0.22 3.15 
(1.56) 
1.92 
(1.20) 
0.00***
2004 31 70 0.26 
(0.44) 
0.14 
(0.36) 
0.25 0.68 
(0.15) 
0.67 
(0.16) 
0.80 3.13 
(2.05) 
1.83 
(1.20) 
0.00***
2005 31 72 0.19 
(0.40) 
0.09 
(0.29) 
0.31 0.67 
(0.14) 
0.63 
(0.14) 
0.32 2.97 
(1.74) 
1.77 
(1.07) 
0.01***
2006 25 54 0.13 
(0.34) 
0.10 
(0.31) 
0.80 0.69 
(0.10) 
0.67 
(0.12) 
0.56 3.25 
(1.45) 
1.85 
(1.18) 
0.00***
2007 36 50 0.22 
(0.42) 
0.14 
(0.35) 
0.43 0.66 
(0.15) 
0.65 
(0.17) 
0.82 3.47 
(1.76) 
1.91 
(1.34) 
0.00***
2008 44 55 0.14 
(0.35) 
0.16 
(0.37) 
0.82 0.69 
(0.15) 
0.60 
(0.21) 
0.15 3.21 
(1.98) 
2.32 
(1.46) 
0.08* 
2009 27 40 0.23 
(0.43) 
0.38 
(0.51) 
0.33 0.63 
(0.16) 
0.65 
(0.16) 
0.69 2.81 
(1.47) 
2.61 
(1.56) 
0.71 
This table summarizes the means for gender, EG index and publication quantity in the dataset, averaged over 
each subset for each variable three years before tenure. Values are presented separately for tenured and non-
tenure groups, along with the p value for the null hypothesis that the means are equal in the two groups.  
1. N: sample number; 
2. T: tenured group;  
3. TN: non-tenured group; 
4. Gender: male=0, female=1; 
5. Extent of specialization: EG Index; 
6. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***: difference significant at 0.01 level; **: difference 
significant at 0.05 level; *: difference significant at 0.1 level.  
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Table 3.2: Means of Publication Quality, Graduate and Current Department Rank 
Year Publication Quality Graduate Department Rank Current Department Rank 
 T1 NT2 p T NT p T NT p 
1996 0.34 
(0.24) 
0.20 
(0.18) 
0.14 1.88 
(1.62) 
2.00 
(1.58) 
0.46 
(0.86) 
2.47 
(1.46) 
3.67 
(1.73) 
0.07* 
1997 0.20 
(0.18) 
0.21 
(0.24) 
0.83 2.94 
(1.95) 
1.87 
(1.06) 
0.06* 3.61 
(1.75) 
3.67 
(1.45) 
0.92 
1998 0.25 
(0.16) 
0.18 
(0.15) 
0.32 2.38 
(1.72) 
2.20 
(1.26) 
0.73 3.00 
(1.80) 
3.80 
(1.57) 
0.15 
 
1999 0.14 
(0.12) 
0.15 
(0.10) 
0.82 2.23 
(1.39) 
2.21 
(1.41) 
0.95 3.76 
(1.64) 
3.41 
(1.50) 
0.49 
2000 0.20 
(0.12) 
0.17 
(0.20) 
0.58 2.76 
(2.02) 
2.67 
(1.74) 
0.86 3.52 
(1.54) 
3.88 
(1.42) 
0.43 
2001 0.20 
(0.15) 
0.13 
(0.08) 
0.10* 1.60 
(0.71) 
2.83 
(1.97) 
0.01*** 3.32 
(1.73) 
3.96 
(1.40) 
0.16 
2002 0.19 
(0.14) 
0.14 
(0.11) 
0.17 2.06 
(1.29) 
2.73 
(1.80) 
0.20 3.06 
(1.95) 
3.73 
(1.82) 
0.27 
2003 0.17 
(0.11) 
0.18 
(0.14) 
0.86 1.78 
(1.09) 
3.00 
(1.77) 
0.00*** 3.33 
(1.82) 
3.69 
(1.83) 
0.48 
2004 0.15 
(0.10) 
0.15 
(0.10) 
0.83 2.29 
(1.40) 
2.85 
(1.77) 
0.16 4.16 
(1.68) 
3.71 
(1.72) 
0.29 
2005 0.18 
(0.15) 
0.17 
(0.17) 
0.79 2.16 
(1.51) 
3.41 
(1.87) 
0.01*** 3.29 
(1.74) 
4.14 
(1.61) 
0.08* 
2006 0.17 
(0.11) 
0.12 
(0.13) 
0.18 2.33 
(1.55) 
3.50 
(1.76) 
0.02** 3.00 
(1.59) 
4.35 
(1.50) 
0.00*** 
2007 0.18 
(0.10) 
0.15 
(0.17) 
0.35 2.53 
(1.78) 
2.73 
(1.80) 
0.68 3.32 
(1.90) 
3.41 
(1.40) 
0.86 
2008 0.18 
(0.11) 
0.17 
(0.14) 
0.82 2.28 
(1.45) 
2.16 
(1.46) 
0.76 2.91 
(1.57) 
3.16 
(1.30) 
0.54 
2009 0.22 
(0.12) 
0.29 
(0.28) 
0.23 2.23 
(1.68) 
2.69 
(1.80) 
0.43 2.96 
(1.66) 
3.15 
(1.63) 
0.73 
This table summarizes the means for several key variables in dataset, averaged over each subset for each 
variable three years before tenure. Values are presented separately for tenured and non-tenure groups, along 
with the p value for the null hypothesis that the means are equal in the two groups.  
1. T: tenured group;  
2. TN: non-tenured group; 
3. Publication quality: as QJE publication 
4. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***: difference significant at 0.01 level; **: difference 
significant at 0.05 level; *: difference significant at 0.1 level.  
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Table 3.3: Average Extent of Specialization before and after Tenure for Groups 1996, 1999, 2001, 2002, 
and 2003. After Tenure Publications: The First, Second and Third Year 
Group Extent of Specialization Non-tenured Group 
(i) 
Tenured Group 
(ii) 
Difference, Tenured 
Group - Non-tenured 
Group (iii) 
1996 EG Index before tenure 0.74 
(0.12) 
0.76 
(0.12) 
0.02 
(0.17) 
EG Index after tenure 0.72 
(0.14) 
0.77 
(0.13) 
0.05 
(0.19) 
Change in mean EG Index -0.02 
(0.18) 
0.01 
(0.18) 
0.03 
(0.25) 
1999 EG Index before tenure 0.71 
(0.13) 
0.75 
(0.12) 
0.04 
(0.18) 
EG Index after tenure 0.71 
(0.12) 
0.78 
(0.09) 
0.07** 
(0.15) 
Change in mean EG Index 0.00 
(0.18) 
0.03 
(0.15) 
0.03 
(0.23) 
2001 EG Index before tenure 0.70 
(0.15) 
0.71 
(0.17) 
0.01 
(0.23) 
EG Index after tenure 0.70 
(0.13) 
0.65 
(0.14) 
-0.05 
(0.19) 
Change in mean EG Index 0.00 
(0.20) 
-0.06 
(0.22) 
-0.06 
(0.30) 
2002 EG Index before tenure 0.70 
(0.10) 
0.67 
(0.17) 
-0.03 
(0.20) 
EG Index after tenure 0.63 
(0.15) 
0.68 
(0.18) 
0.05 
(0.23) 
Change in mean EG Index -0.07 
(0.18) 
0.01 
(0.25) 
0.08 
(0.31) 
2003 EG Index before tenure 0.71 
(0.11) 
0.66 
(0.17) 
-0.05 
(0.20) 
EG Index after tenure 0.65 
(0.15) 
0.70 
(0.12) 
0.05 
(0.19) 
Change in mean EG Index -0.06 
(0.19) 
0.04 
(0.21) 
0.10** 
(0.28) 
This table summarizes the levels and changes in average extent of specialization per scholar for each subset 
three years before tenure and the first, second and third year after tenure in groups 1996, 1999, 2001, 2002, 
and 2003. Columns (i) and (ii) are the average extent of specialization data for the tenured and non-tenured 
groups. The differences in average extent of specialization between tenured and non-tenured group are 
presented in column (iii). Rows 4, 7 and so on present the changes in average extent of specialization between 
pre-tenure and post-tenure period for each group. These entries are the differences between the average extent 
of specialization for the two periods. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***: difference significant at 0.01 level; **: difference significant 
at 0.05 level; *: difference significant at 0.1 level. 
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Table 3.4: Average Extent of Specialization before and after Tenure for Groups 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 
and 2009. After Tenure Publications: The First, Second and Third Year. 
Group Extent of Specialization Non-tenured Group 
(i) 
Tenured Group 
(ii) 
Difference, Tenured 
Group - Non-tenured 
Group (iii) 
2004 
 
 
EG Index before tenure 0.67 
(0.16) 
0.68 
(0.15) 
0.01 
(0.22) 
EG Index after tenure 0.64 
(0.18) 
0.72 
(0.11) 
0.08 
(0.21) 
Change in mean EG Index -0.03 
(0.24) 
0.04 
(0.19) 
0.07 
(0.31) 
2005 EG Index before tenure 0.63 
(0.14) 
0.67 
(0.14) 
0.04 
(0.20) 
EG Index after tenure 0.65 
(0.15) 
0.65 
(0.12) 
0.00 
(0.19) 
Change in mean EG Index 0.02 
(0.21) 
-0.02 
(0.18) 
-0.04 
(0.26) 
2006 EG Index before tenure 0.67 
(0.12) 
0.69 
(0.10) 
0.02 
(0.16) 
EG Index after tenure 0.65 
(0.16) 
0.67 
(0.12) 
0.02 
(0.20) 
Change in mean EG Index -0.06 
(0.20) 
-0.03 
(0.16) 
0.00 
(0.26) 
2007 EG Index before tenure 0.65 
(0.17) 
0.66 
(0.15) 
0.01 
(0.23) 
EG Index after tenure 0.60 
(0.16) 
0.65 
(0.16) 
0.05 
(0.23) 
Change in mean EG Index -0.05 
(0.23) 
-0.01 
(0.22) 
0.04 
(0.32) 
2009 EG Index before tenure 0.65 
(0.16) 
0.63 
(0.17) 
-0.02 
(0.23) 
EG Index after tenure 0.58 
(0.14) 
0.62 
(0.12) 
0.04 
(0.18) 
Change in mean EG Index -0.07 
(0.21) 
-0.01 
(0.21) 
0.06 
(0.30) 
This table summarizes the levels and changes in average extent of specialization per scholar for each subset 
three years before tenure and the first, second and third year after tenure in groups 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 
and 2009. Columns (i) and (ii) are the average extent of specialization data for the tenured and non-tenured 
groups. The differences in average extent of specialization between tenured and non-tenured group are 
presented in column (iii). Rows 4, 7 and so on present the changes in average extent of specialization between 
pre-tenure and post-tenure period for each group. These entries are the differences between the average extent 
of specialization for the two periods. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***: difference significant at 0.01 level; **: difference significant 
at 0.05 level; *: difference significant at 0.1 level.  
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Table 3.5: Estimation of Tenure Effect on the Extent of Specialization. After Tenure Publications: The 
First, Second and Third Year. 
Group Model 1 
 (i) 
Model 2 
(ii) 
Model 3 
(ii) 
Sample 
Size 
(N) 	ߜ	  
estimate 
Standard 
error of 
regression 
ߜ   
estimate 
Standard 
error of 
regression 
ߜ   
estimate 
Standard 
error of 
regression 
1996 0.03 
(0.07) 
0.13 0.02 
(0.07) 
0.13 0.02 
(0.07) 
0.13 67 
1999 0.03 
(0.05) 
0.12 
 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.12 
 
0.02 
(0.05) 
0.11 
 
89 
2001 -0.06 
(0.05) 
0.14 -0.06 
(0.05) 
0.14 -0.06 
(0.05) 
0.14 111 
2002 0.08 
(0.06) 
0.15 0.08 
(0.06) 
0.15 0.08 
(0.06) 
0.15 98 
2003 0.10* 
(0.05) 
0.14 0.10* 
(0.05) 
0.14 0.09* 
(0.05) 
0.14 118 
2004 0.06 
(0.05) 
0.16 0.06 
(0.05) 
0.16 0.06 
(0.05) 
0.16 136 
2005 -0.04 
(0.05) 
0.14 -0.04 
(0.05) 
0.14 -0.04 
(0.05) 
0.14 119 
2006 0.00 
(0.05) 
0.13 0.00 
(0.05) 
0.13 0.00 
(0.05) 
0.13 98 
2007 0.04 
(0.06) 
0.16 0.04 
(0.06) 
0.16 0.03 
(0.06) 
0.15 126 
2009 0.06 
(0.07) 
0.14 0.06 
(0.07) 
0.15 0.06 
(0.07) 
0.14 98 
In Model 1,  ߜ  is estimated without control variables. In Model 2,  ߜ  is estimated with control variables: 
gender, ranking of graduate department, and ranking of employing department during the observation. In 
Model 3, ߜ is estimated with control variables: gender, ranking of graduate department, ranking of employing 
department during the observation, and number of departments worked in before. 
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Table 3.6: Average Extent of Specialization before and after Tenure for Groups 1996, 1999, 2001, 2002, 
and 2003. After Tenure Publications: The Second, Third and Fourth Year. 
Group Extent of Specialization Non-tenured Group 
(i) 
Tenured Group 
(ii) 
Difference, Tenured 
Group - Non-tenured 
Group (iii) 
1996 EG Index before tenure 0.74 
(0.12) 
0.76 
(0.12) 
0.02 
(0.17) 
EG Index after tenure 0.74 
(0.12) 
0.75 
(0.09) 
0.01 
(0.18) 
Change in mean EG Index -0.00 
(0.17) 
-0.01 
(0.18) 
-0.01 
(0.25) 
1999 EG Index before tenure 0.71 
(0.13) 
0.75 
(0.12) 
0.04 
(0.18) 
EG Index after tenure 0.69 
(0.12) 
0.76 
(0.11) 
0.07* 
(0.16) 
Change in mean EG Index -0.02 
(0.18) 
0.01 
(0.16) 
0.03 
(0.24) 
2001 EG Index before tenure 0.7 
(0.15) 
0.71 
(0.17) 
0.01 
(0.23) 
EG Index after tenure 0.68 
(0.13) 
0.64 
(0.14) 
-0.04 
(0.19) 
Change in mean EG Index -0.02 
(0.20) 
-0.07 
(0.22) 
-0.05 
(0.30) 
2002 EG Index before tenure 0.70 
(0.10) 
0.67 
(0.17) 
-0.03 
(0.20) 
EG Index after tenure 0.63 
(0.13) 
0.71 
(0.17) 
0.08* 
(0.21) 
Change in mean EG Index -0.08 
(0.16) 
0.03 
(0.24) 
0.11* 
(0.29) 
2003 EG Index before tenure 0.71 
(0.11) 
0.66 
(0.17) 
-0.05 
(0.20) 
EG Index after tenure 0.66 
(0.15) 
0.68 
(0.11) 
0.02 
(0.19) 
Change in mean EG Index -0.05 
(0.19) 
0.02 
(0.20) 
0.07 
(0.28) 
This table summarizes the levels and changes in the average extent of specialization per scholar for each 
subset three years before tenure and the second, third and fourth year after tenure in groups 1996, 1999, 2001, 
2002, and 2003. Columns (i) and (ii) are the average extent of specialization data for the tenured and non-
tenured groups. The differences in average extent of specialization between tenured and non-tenured group 
are presented in column (iii). Rows 4, 7 and so on present the changes in average extent of specialization 
between pre-tenure and post-tenure period for each group. These entries are the differences between the 
averages extent of specialization for the two periods. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***: difference significant at 0.01 level; **: difference significant 
at 0.05 level; *: difference significant at 0.1 level. 
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Table 3.7: Average Extent of Specialization before and after Tenure for Groups 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 
2009. After Tenure Publications: The second, Third and Fourth Year. 
Group Extent of Specialization Non-tenured Group 
(i) 
Tenured Group 
(ii) 
Difference, Tenured 
Group - Non-tenured 
Group (iii) 
2004 
 
 
EG Index before tenure 0.67 
(0.16) 
0.68 
(0.15) 
0.01 
(0.22) 
EG Index after tenure 0.66 
(0.16) 
0.69 
(0.12) 
0.03 
(0.20) 
Change in mean EG Index -0.01 
(0.23) 
0.01 
(0.19) 
0.02 
(0.30) 
2005 EG Index before tenure 0.63 
(0.14) 
0.67 
(0.14) 
0.04 
(0.20) 
EG Index after tenure 0.63 
(0.17) 
0.62 
(0.16) 
-0.01 
(0.23) 
Change in mean EG Index 0.00 
(0.22) 
-0.05 
(0.21) 
-0.05 
(0.30) 
2006 EG Index before tenure 0.67 
(0.12) 
0.69 
(0.10) 
0.02 
(0.16) 
EG Index after tenure 0.58 
(0.18) 
0.61 
(0.15) 
0.03 
(0.23) 
Change in mean EG Index -0.09 
(0.22) 
-0.08 
(0.18) 
0.01 
(0.28) 
2007 EG Index before tenure 0.65 
(0.17) 
0.66 
(0.15) 
0.01 
(0.23) 
EG Index after tenure 0.59 
(0.15) 
0.62 
(0.16) 
0.03 
(0.22) 
Change in mean EG Index -0.06 
(0.23) 
-0.04 
(0.22) 
0.02 
(0.32) 
2009 EG Index before tenure 0.65 
(0.16) 
0.63 
(0.17) 
-0.02 
(0.23) 
EG Index after tenure 0.60 
(0.14) 
0.61 
(0.15) 
0.01 
(0.21) 
Change in mean EG Index -0.05 
(0.21) 
-0.02 
(0.23) 
0.03 
(0.31) 
This table summarizes the levels and changes in the average extent of specialization per scholar for each 
subset three years before tenure and the second, third and fourth year after tenure in groups 2004, 2005, 2006, 
2007, and 2009. Columns (i) and (ii) are average extent of specialization data for tenured and non-tenured 
group. The differences in the average extent of specialization between tenured and non-tenured groups are 
presented in column (iii). Rows 4, 7 and so on present the changes in the average extent of specialization 
between the pre-tenure and post-tenure periods for each group. These entries are the differences between the 
average extent of specialization for the two periods. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***: difference significant at 0.01 level; **: difference significant 
at 0.05 level; *: difference significant at 0.1 level. 
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Table 3.8: Estimation of Tenure Effect on the Extent of Specialization. After Tenure Publications: The 
Second, Third and Fourth Year. 
Group Model 1 
 (i) 
Model 2 
(ii) 
Model 3 
(ii) 
Sample 
Size 
(N) 	ߜ	  
estimate 
Standard 
error of 
regression 
ߜ   
estimate 
Standard 
error of 
regression 
ߜ   
estimate 
Standard 
error of 
regression 
1996 -0.008 
(0.06) 
0.11 -0.009 
(0.06) 
0.11 -0.014 
(0.06) 
0.11 67 
1999 0.02 
(0.05) 
0.12 
 
0.02 
(0.05) 
0.12 
 
0.02 
(0.05) 
0.12 
 
88 
2001 -0.05 
(0.06) 
0.14 -0.05 
(0.05) 
0.14 -0.04 
(0.05) 
0.14 108 
2002 0.10* 
(0.06) 
0.14 0.10* 
(0.06) 
0.14 0.10* 
(0.06) 
0.14 95 
2003 0.07 
(0.05) 
0.14 0.06 
(0.05) 
0.14 0.06 
(0.05) 
0.14 117 
2004 0.02 
(0.05) 
0.15 0.02 
(0.05) 
0.15 0.02 
(0.05) 
0.15 141 
2005 -0.05 
(0.06) 
0.15 -0.06 
(0.06) 
0.15 -0.05 
(0.06) 
0.15 118 
2006 0.008 
(0.06) 
0.15 0.003 
(0.06) 
0.15 -0.003 
(0.06) 
0.14 99 
2007 0.03 
(0.06) 
0.16 0.02 
(0.06) 
0.15 0.02 
(0.06) 
0.16 129 
2009 0.03 
(0.07) 
0.16 0.03 
(0.07) 
0.16 0.03 
(0.07) 
0.16 86 
In Model 1,  ߜ  is estimated without control variables. In Model 2,  ߜ  is estimated with control variables: 
gender, ranking of graduate department, and ranking of employing department during the observation. In 
Model 3,  ߜ   is estimated with control variables: gender, ranking of graduate department, ranking of 
employing department during the observation, and number of departments worked in before. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***: difference significant at 0.01 level; **: difference significant 
at 0.05 level; *: difference significant at 0.1 level. 
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Table 3.9: Average Extent of Specialization before and after Tenure for Groups 1996, 1999, 2001, 2002, 
and 2003. After Tenure Publications: The First, Second, Third and Fourth Year. 
Group Extent of Specialization Non-tenured Group 
(i) 
Tenured Group 
(ii) 
Difference, Tenured 
Group - Non-tenured 
Group (iii) 
1996 EG Index before tenure 0.74 
(0.12) 
0.76 
(0.12) 
0.02 
(0.17) 
EG Index after tenure 0.75 
(0.11) 
0.77 
(0.10) 
0.02 
(0.15) 
Change in mean EG Index 0.01 
(0.16) 
0.01 
(0.16) 
0.00 
(0.23) 
1999 EG Index before tenure 0.71 
(0.13) 
0.75 
(0.12) 
0.04 
(0.18) 
EG Index after tenure 0.71 
(0.12) 
0.78 
(0.09) 
0.07** 
(0.15) 
Change in mean EG Index 0.00 
(0.18) 
0.03 
(0.15) 
0.03 
(0.23) 
2001 EG Index before tenure 0.70 
(0.15) 
0.71 
(0.17) 
0.01 
(0.23) 
EG Index after tenure 0.70 
(0.12) 
0.65 
(0.14) 
-0.05 
(0.18) 
Change in mean EG Index 0.00 
(0.19) 
-0.06 
(0.22) 
-0.06 
(0.29) 
2002 EG Index before tenure 0.70 
(0.10) 
0.67 
(0.17) 
-0.03 
(0.20) 
EG Index after tenure 0.65 
(0.12) 
0.70 
(0.16) 
0.05 
(0.20) 
Change in mean EG Index -0.05 
(0.16) 
0.03 
(0.23) 
0.08 
(0.28) 
2003 EG Index before tenure 0.71 
(0.11) 
0.66 
(0.17) 
-0.05 
(0.20) 
EG Index after tenure 0.67 
(0.15) 
0.72 
(0.10) 
0.05* 
(0.18) 
Change in mean EG Index -0.04 
(0.19) 
0.06 
(0.20) 
0.10** 
(0.28) 
This table summarizes the levels and changes in the average extent of specialization per scholar for each 
subset three years before tenure and the first, second, third and fourth year after tenure in groups 1996, 1999, 
2001, 2002, and 2003. Columns (i) and (ii) are the average extent of specialization data for the tenured and 
non-tenured groups. The differences in average extent of specialization between tenured and non-tenured 
group are presented in column (iii). Rows 4, 7 and so on present the changes in average extent of 
specialization between pre-tenure and post-tenure period for each group. These entries are the differences 
between the average extent of specialization for the two periods. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***: difference significant at 0.01 level; **: difference significant 
at 0.05 level; *: difference significant at 0.1 level. 
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Table 3.10: Average Extent of Specialization before and after Tenure for Groups 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 
and 2009. After Tenure Publications: The First, Second, Third and Fourth Year. 
Group Extent of Specialization Non-tenured Group 
(i) 
Tenured Group 
(ii) 
Difference, Tenured 
Group - Non-tenured 
Group (iii) 
2004 
 
 
EG Index before tenure 0.67 
(0.16) 
0.68 
(0.15) 
0.01 
(0.22) 
EG Index after tenure 0.66 
(0.15) 
0.72 
(0.11) 
0.06 
(0.19) 
Change in mean EG Index -0.05 
(0.22) 
0.06 
(0.19) 
0.11 
(0.29) 
2005 EG Index before tenure 0.63 
(0.14) 
0.67 
(0.14) 
0.04 
(0.20) 
EG Index after tenure 0.66 
(0.12) 
0.66 
(0.11) 
0.00 
(0.16) 
Change in mean EG Index 0.03 
(0.18) 
-0.01 
(0.18) 
-0.04 
(0.25) 
2006 EG Index before tenure 0.67 
(0.12) 
0.69 
(0.10) 
0.02 
(0.16) 
EG Index after tenure 0.61 
(0.17) 
0.66 
(0.12) 
0.05 
(0.21) 
Change in mean EG Index -0.06 
(0.21) 
-0.03 
(0.16) 
0.03 
(0.26) 
2007 EG Index before tenure 0.65 
(0.17) 
0.66 
(0.15) 
0.01 
(0.23) 
EG Index after tenure 0.61 
(0.15) 
0.66 
(0.15) 
0.05 
(0.21) 
Change in mean EG Index -0.05 
(0.23) 
0.00 
(0.21) 
0.04 
(0.31) 
2009 EG Index before tenure 0.65 
(0.16) 
0.63 
(0.17) 
-0.02 
(0.23) 
EG Index after tenure 0.61 
(0.13) 
0.63 
(0.12) 
0.02 
(0.18) 
Change in mean EG Index -0.04 
(0.21) 
0.00 
(0.21) 
0.04 
(0.30) 
This table summarizes the levels and changes in average extent of specialization per scholar for each subset 
three years before tenure and the first, second, third and fourth year after tenure in groups 2004, 2005, 2006, 
2007, and 2009. Columns (i) and (ii) are average extent of specialization data for the tenured and non-tenured 
groups. The differences in average extent of specialization between tenured and non-tenured group are 
presented in column (iii). Rows 4, 7 and so on present the changes in average extent of specialization between 
pre-tenure and post-tenure period for each group. These entries are the differences between the averages 
extent of specialization for the two periods. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***: difference significant at 0.01 level; **: difference significant 
at 0.05 level; *: difference significant at 0.1 level.  
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Table 3.11: Estimation of Tenure Effect on the Extent of Specialization. After Tenure Publications: The 
First, Second, Third and Fourth Year. 
Group Model 1 
 (i) 
Model 2 
(ii) 
Model 3 
(ii) 
Sample 
Size 
(N) 	ߜ	  
estimate 
Standard 
error of 
regression 
ߜ   
estimate 
Standard 
error of 
regression 
ߜ   
estimate 
Standard 
error of 
regression 
1996 0.003 
(0.06) 
0.11 0.001 
(0.06) 
0.11 -0.03 
(0.06) 
0.11 68 
1999 0.03 
(0.05) 
0.12 
 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.12 
 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.12 
 
94 
2001 -0.05 
(0.05) 
0.14 -0.06 
(0.05) 
0.13 -0.05 
(0.05) 
0.13 113 
2002 0.07 
(0.06) 
0.14 0.07 
(0.06) 
0.13 0.07 
(0.06) 
0.14 102 
2003 0.10** 
(0.05) 
0.14 0.10** 
(0.05) 
0.13 0.10** 
(0.05) 
0.13 123 
2004 0.04 
(0.05) 
0.15 0.04 
(0.05) 
0.15 0.04 
(0.05) 
0.15 144 
2005 -0.04 
(0.05) 
0.13 -0.04 
(0.05) 
0.13 -0.04 
(0.05) 
0.12 122 
2006 0.02 
(0.05) 
0.13 0.02 
(0.05) 
0.13 0.02 
(0.05) 
0.13 105 
2007 0.04 
(0.05) 
0.15 0.04 
(0.05) 
0.15 0.04 
(0.05) 
0.15 132 
2009 0.04 
(0.06) 
0.14 0.04 
(0.06) 
0.14 0.05 
(0.06) 
0.14 89 
In Model 1,  ߜ  is estimated without control variables. In Model 2, ߜ is estimated with control variables: 
gender, ranking of graduate department, and ranking of employing department during the observation. In 
Model 3,  ߜ   is estimated with control variables: gender, ranking of graduate department, ranking of 
employing department during the observation, and number of departments worked in before. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***: difference significant at 0.01 level; **: difference significant 
at 0.05 level; *: difference significant at 0.1 level.  
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4 RESEARCH SPECIALIZATION AND PRODUCTIVITY 
4.1 Introduction 
One of the most consistent findings in the literature on research productivity is that 
female researchers tend to publish at lower rates than male researchers (Fox 1983; Fox & 
Faver 1984; Xie & Shauman 1998; Zainab 1999; Nakhaie 2002; Mairesse & Pezzoni 2015). 
Such differences have been reported in numerous studies of diverse countries (Prpić 2002; 
Ledin et al. 2007; Abramo et al. 2009; Larivière et al. 2011) and disciplines (Bordons et 
al. 2003; Leahey 2006; Peñas & Willett 2006; Taylor et al. 2006), spanning decades 
(Bentley 2011; van Arensbergen et al. 2012) and using a wide range of measures (Long 
1992; Powell et al. 2009). 
This well-established finding leads to the following questions: Why do male 
researchers achieve better performance than female researchers? Which factors lead male 
researchers to produce more? After reviewing many explanations in the literature, I assert 
that documenting gender difference in productivity is one thing, while accounting for it is 
another. The variation in publication may be clear; the explanations are not.  
Previous research into gender differences of productivity have considered many 
factors. Zukerman (2001) categorized related explanations into four different types: 
scientific ability, self-selection, social selection, and accumulated disadvantage. However, 
investigations into supposed related factors from the above four categories do not show 
conclusive results (Xie & Shauman 1998; Fuchs et al. 2001; Wenneras & Wold 2001; Prpić 
2002; Stack 2004; Fox 2005; Brink et al. 2006; Van Den Brink & Stobbe 2009; Hunter & 
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Leahey 2010). Despite these efforts, the persistently inadequate explained gender 
differences in academic publication still remain of concern to researchers. 
 Ellison (2000) pointed out a fairly common perception is that economics research 
is becoming more complex and the field more specialized over the last few decades. There 
is also widespread anecdotal evidence that specialization matters, and the productivity 
gains realized from specializing seem intuitive. In addition, females might self-select to 
work more broadly, while male economists prefer to work restrictedly on limited topics. 
However, there do not appear to have been many detailed studies that have actually tried 
to measure the degree of research specialization and utilized it to test the effects in research 
performance by gender. Empirical research developing and measuring the degree of 
individuals’ research specialization is surprisingly sparse.  The most-related study to this 
research might be Leahey (2006) who examined the extent of the specialization index by 
comparing the cumulative number of publications to the cumulative number of unique 
keyword descriptors for journal articles.  In her study, a probability sample of academics 
in two disciplines (sociology and linguistics) was used to address the question of whether 
the extent of research specialization explains the process gender affecting productivity. The 
basic finding is that the extent of research specialization plays an important role, as being 
more focused on a restricted number of subfields improves men’s productivity. 
Figure 4.1 motivates the paper, as it provides an overview of productivity and extent 
of specialization measures attained by female and male economists every three years after 
graduation in one of the ten fields. The EG index and QJE publications measure the extent 
of specialization and productivity, explained in the following, but the figure provides 
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evidence that female economists seem to specialize less and publish less generally with a 
few exceptions. In addition, although values for different triennial periods under 
observations show variations within each sub-discipline, they are usually consistent with 
the general results. This leads to the question of whether gender differences in productivity 
are due to the gender difference in the extent of specialization. It is likely that female and 
male economists specialize to different degrees and the extent to which one’s research 
program is specialized affects productivity rates.  
In this paper, I contribute to the extant literature examining gender difference in 
productivity in three aspects. First, in addition to Leahey’s (2006) study which is based on 
the sample from sociology and linguistics, I study researchers from economics to check 
how the extent of specialization affects female and male economists’ research performance. 
Second, I extend the understanding of this process by further inquiring into how the 
extent of specialization mediates the gender effect on productivity across generations. 
Several studies have shown that gender difference in productivity changes over time 
(Bentley 2011; van Arensbergen et al. 2012). As this study tries to find how the degree of 
specialization explains productivity, an analysis of different generations will inform the 
related question as to whether the effect is persistent.   
At last, I turn to the subfields in which economists work. Economics has gradually 
grown into a large discipline ,and main trends have changed over the last decade 
(Karbownik & Knauff 2009). There exists gender differences in the distribution of 
academics across areas of specialization in economics research (Hamermesh 2005). Even 
though the fraction of female economists chose women’s topics—e.g., female labor supply 
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behavior, gender discrimination, economics of the family, etc.—is smaller today, such 
topics are still disproportionate among new female PhDs. Dolado, Felgueroso, and 
Almunia (2012) also noted that women are unevenly distributed across fields. In addition, 
sub-disciplines in Economics are heterogeneous. For example, research methods, strategies 
and publication and citation patterns may differ substantially between Econometrics and 
Economics History and Thought. Hence, a field study with a discipline-context control may 
be valuable.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 documents the main 
facts about the distribution of female and male economists across fields; it also analyzes 
how female and male economists differ in productivity and extent of specialization by time 
and field.  Econometric results are presented in Sections 4.3. Finally, section 4.4 concludes.  
4.2 Data Summary 
4.2.1 Number of Publications by Gender and Field 
Table 4.1 presents the number difference among publications in all and one of the 
ten fields for female and male economists. One can observe significant differences between 
female and male economists in terms of frequencies of the fields. In all fields, male 
economists publish more than female economists. Labor and Consumer Economics has the 
largest number of articles published by female economists, and the share is also the highest, 
22.84%, but it is still a very small share compared to male economists, which is 77.17%.  
The number of articles belongs to Economic History and Thought is the smallest, but the 
share of female economists is 22.52%, which is just less than the share in Labor and 
Consumer Economics. Female economists publish the least in Resource and Agricultural 
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Economics, and only with a share of 7.26%.  The share of female economists in all other 
seven fields varies between 9% and 16%.  
4.2.2 Mean Values of Extent of Specialization and Publication Quality 
For the purpose of this study, analyses are arranged in the following ways. First, I 
considered all 699 faculty together in the sample. Then I divided the sample according to 
graduation year and fields.  I listed the means of the whole sample in all tables used to 
present the means of extent of specialization and productivity for comparison. As a whole 
sample, the mean QJE publications is 0.14 for female and 0.19 for male. Females on 
average publish 35 percent less than males. Standard deviations indicate greater variability 
among females.   
Data from Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show substantial differences in the extent of 
specialization and productivity for all four cohorts. Cohorts are grouped according to the 
year they received their doctoral degree. Of all four cohorts, males are more focused than 
females. The difference between male and female economists is significant in the 1995-
1999 cohort. The specialization indices are highest in the 1990-1994 cohort and decrease 
as graduation year increases for both genders.  Male economists have higher productivity 
in all four cohorts, although the differences are not substantial. Higher levels of 
specialization accompany higher productivity of all four cohorts, suggesting that the extent 
of specialization might affect productivity positively.  
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 indicate the mean values for the extent of specialization and 
productivity by field. Compared to Tables 4.2 and 4.3, when data are disaggregated by 
fields, the data show several interesting points. Firstly, there are significant differences in 
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the extent of specialization between genders for IO/ Business Economics, Microeconomics 
Theory, Trade and Development and Economic History and Thought. For Public 
Economics, both female and male economists share the same extent of specialization. The 
EG index is 0.69, which indicates that the frequency with which I see pairs of papers by 
the same author being in the same subfield of Public Economics matches what would be 
expected if 69 percent of authors wrote all of their papers in a single subfield and 31 percent 
of authors wrote in subfields that were completely uncorrelated from paper to paper. For 
Labor and Consumer Economics and Macroeconomics, females have more narrowed 
research than male. Of all other fields, males tend to be more focused on a restricted number 
of subfields, whereas females’ research are characterized by more breadth. In addition, 
when sorted by fields, the data of specialization index show strong heterogeneity among 
fields. Both females and males work most narrowly within the field of Econometrics, while 
doing the opposite within Economic History and Thought. The Ellison-Glaeser indices for 
each gender in Econometrics are female with 0.79 and male with 0.80, compared to 
Economic History and Thought, 0.42 and 0.53 respectively.  
Secondly, data of the average production of both male and female reveal gender 
differences in productivity. According to an analysis of the whole sample, females on 
average publish 35 percent less than males, and the standard deviations indicate greater 
variability among females.  However, when the data are disaggregated by fields, the picture 
is different. To my surprise, females do not publish less than males in all ten fields. Females 
have more or equal articles as males in four fields: Labor and Consumer Economics, 
Resource and Agriculture Economics, Economic History and Thought and Financial 
Economics. This finding has not been observed before, since most previous studies do not 
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consider differences between subfields in economics (Fox 1983; Fox & Faver 1984; Xie & 
Shauman 1998; Zainab 1999; Nakhaie 2002; Mairesse & Pezzoni 2015).  
Thirdly, it is evident that productivity is correlated to the extent of specialization, 
although the direction might vary among fields. Independent of gender, higher degree of 
specialization results in higher productivity in Labor and Consumer Economics, IO/ 
Business Economics, Microeconomic Theory, Trade and Development, Public Economics, 
Econometrics and Financial Econometrics. The opposite is true for the areas of 
Macroeconomics, Resource and Agriculture Economics and Economic History and 
Thought.   
4.3 Empirical model and results 
4.3.1 Econometric Model 
Figure 4.2 presents a simple model for illustrative purposes. Gender’s effect on 
productivity could be examined in a simple model. However, this direct effect could hide 
important indirect effects which are an important part of understanding the difference. This 
study aims to find out how gender difference in productivity confounds other gender-
related factors, specifically the extent of specialization.  The simple model illustrated in 
Figure 4.2 might not be sufficient for the analysis necessary to figure out the mediate effects 
of extent of specialization.  
The model presented in Figure 4.3 decomposes gender’s effect on productivity into 
two parts: a direct effect and an indirect effect through the extent of specialization. In this 
setup, I am able to find out the relative importance of the indirect effect of gender on 
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productivity through the extent of specialization. When gender’s indirect effect is large, I 
can understand the process by which how gender’s effect on productivity works.  
I used path analysis, a simultaneous equation modeling, to assess the mediating 
effects of the extent of research specialization.  Xie and Shauman (1998) pointed out that, 
in order to analyze how the extent of research specialization mediates gender difference in 
research productivity, the following condition would have to be satisfied: the effect of the 
extent of research specialization has on productivity should be in the opposite direction 
compared to the effect gender has on the extent of research specialization. This condition 
is satisfied in this study, since I expected the extent of specialization to affect productivity 
positively and to be negatively related to gender. 
The model is specified in the following two equations: 
௜ܲ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܩ௜ ൅ ߚଶ ௜ܵ ൅ ߛᇱܼ௜ ൅ ߝ௜    (1) 
௜ܵ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܩ௜ ൅ ߳௜  (2) 
The dependent variable, ௜ܲ  in equation (1) is the accumulated productivity of 
individual ݅  in the observed period. ܩ௜  indicates gender. ௜ܵ  is the index of  extent of 
research specialization in the period when the productivity is measured. The vector of 
individual-level controls, ܼ௜, includes career age, current position rank, rankings of current 
employing department and PhD granting department.  
4.3.2 Results  
The separate effect of each independent variable on productivity (QJE equivalent 
publications) is indicated in Table 4.8, Table 4.9 and Table 4.10. 
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4.3.2.1 Whole Sample 
I begin the analysis with the whole sample. I have already seen from the descriptive 
tables (Tables 4.6 and 4.7) that men and women differ greatly in their productivity and 
women may tend to have less specialized research.  Results from the model show the 
expected direction of the effect. The extent of specialization variable is clearly the strongest 
predictor of productivity. Male economists specialize more than female economists and the 
extent of specialization increases productivity. Each of the effect is statistically significant 
at the 0.01 level. For the whole sample, both genders’ direct and indirect effects on 
productivity are significant, and the indirect effect on productivity through specialization 
is almost three times larger than gender’s direct effect on productivity. Except ranking of 
current employing department, all other control variables, including career age, current 
position rank and ranking of PhD granting department, are positively associated with 
productivity. 
4.3.2.2 An Analysis of Different Cohorts 
Table 4.8 provides information for the four-generation samples. In line with the 
whole sample, the extent of specialization is also the strongest predictor of productivity for 
all generations. The effect differs among four generations. It has the largest effect in the 
2000-2004 cohort, and the least effect in the youngest generation, 2005-2009.  When 
comparing the degree of effect that the extent of specialization has on productivity between 
different generations, the effect on the 1990-1994 cohort is more than two times larger than 
the 1995-1999 cohort and even larger between the 1990-1994 cohort and other two younger 
generations. All in all, the effect of the extent of specialization on productivity might be on 
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the long-run side. The effect of restricting one’s research to a limited number of topics 
becomes more obvious as time goes by.  
The result also demonstrates what I found descriptively: females tend to publish 
fewer articles than men, a result consistent between older and younger generations. The 
direct effects of gender on productivity are substantial and significant for the 1990-1994 
cohort, 1995-1999 cohort and 2000-2004 cohort; while the indirect effects on productivity 
are mild and only significant for the 1995-1999 cohort. Both indirect and direct effects 
have the expected direction for the youngest generation, 2005-2009 cohort, although they 
are not significant. In addition, no matter the older or younger generation, gender’s indirect 
effect on productivity is less than the direct effect, which suggests that, although female 
economists tend to specialize to a lower degree and this might mean a lower productivity 
rate, other factors should be considered before concluding. The analysis shows that the 
extent of specialization is important to the gender difference in the process of research.  
Different from the whole sample, the ranking of PhD-granting departments and 
current employing departments generally does not promote productivity rate. Career age is 
positively associated with productivity for the younger cohorts, 2000-2004 and 2005-2009 
cohorts, but it fails to achieve significance for the older cohorts, 1990-1994 and 1995-1999 
cohorts. Arguably, time devoted to research is an important factor for publication rate; 
however, the marginal effect of time is decreasing and finally diminishing. Being associate 
or full professor increases productivity significantly across all generations. Higher rank 
might give economists more opportunity to access resources to enhance their productivity 
rate.   
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4.3.2.3 A More Detailed View of Specific Fields 
Previous analysis is done at the level of the Economics discipline as a whole. What 
would happen if I focused on specific disciplines? The results from Table 4.9 and Table 
4.10 for different fields are mixed.  I noticed that specialization has a significant positive 
effect in all fields except Economic History and Thought. According to the coefficients, 
the relationship of extent of specialization to productivity is strongest for the Econometrics 
(4.42). This might be due to the characteristics of Econometrics. Research in Econometrics 
tries to find models or estimators that have desirable statistical properties. Thoroughly 
understanding knowledge in a specific topic requires a great deal of time and effort. 
Researchers might benefit from limiting their research topics and digging deeply.   
How the extent of specialization mediates the effects of gender on productivity 
differs greatly among fields. Some fields even show opposite results. First, in line with the 
whole sample, in three fields, Microeconomics Theory, Trade and Development and 
IO/Business Economics, gender’s indirect effects on productivity are significant. Male 
economists are more focused in these fields than female economists and have a higher 
productivity rate. Second, per the descriptive table, female and male economists do not 
differ significantly in their productivity in the following four fields: Macroeconomics, 
Financial Economics, Public Economics and Econometrics. Model results are consistent 
with the descriptive data.  Gender’s indirect and direct effects on productivity are both 
insignificant, although they are in the expected direction. Third, so far, all model results 
show that females are less focused and miss out on important ways to improve their 
productivity. However, the model performs in the opposite way in Labor and Consumer 
Economics, Resource and Agricultural Economics and Economic History and Thought. As 
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with other fields, females tend to not work more broadly. However, what’s different is that 
females publish more than males in these fields even with lower degrees of specialization, 
especially in Labor and Consumer Economics and Economic History and Thought, the two 
fields wherein the direction in which gender affects specialization differs from what I 
expected. Both gender’s direct and indirect effect on productivity is positive. In addition, 
the direct effect is significant.  
Other factors, including career age, current position rank and rankings of current 
employing department and PhD-granting department, becomes insignificant except current 
position rank in Econometrics, Labor and Consumer Economics, Microeconomics and 
Macroeconomics and PhD-granting department ranking in Microeconomics and Public 
Economics .  
To summarize, the model evaluating the impacts of the extent of research 
specialization as an intervening factor performs well in explaining gender differences in 
productivity for the whole sample and four different generations. Male economists 
specialize more and thereby publish more, when controlling for other factors. However, 
how the differences in the research processes influence productivity are not consistent 
when I deal with different fields. In Microeconomics Theory, Trade and Development and 
IO/Business Economics, females significantly specialize in lower levels and publish less. 
In Labor and Consumer Economics, females have both higher productivity and the extent 
of research specialization. In Financial Economics, Public Economics and Econometrics, 
although there are gender differences in productivity and extent of specialization, effects 
are not significant. Findings from Resource and Agricultural Economics and Economic 
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History and Thought are contrary to the expectation and different from all other fields: 
females specialize less, whereas they have higher quality of publications.  
4.4 Conclusion 
The main objective of this study is to explain gender difference in productivity via 
gender differences in the extent of research specialization. I began with the expectation that 
female and male economists employ different research processes. Female and male 
economists specialize to different degrees, resulting in different productivity rate.  For this 
purpose, I performed the analysis on different levels.  
First, I analyzed economists across ten fields and twenty-five years, finding that the 
extent of specialization is a critical intervening variable in economics, which is in line with 
Leahey’s (2006) study in the sociology of science. Working in the same area or closely 
related area repeatedly promotes productivity, but females tend to spread out their research; 
therefore, they have lower productivity. This mediating effect is large and statistically 
significant. Second, when I conducted the analysis for different generations grouped 
according to graduation years, the results are the same as the whole sample. Moreover, the 
extent of research specialization has a larger effect on productivity for the older generation 
relative to younger generations. As experience accumulates, having specialized research 
promotes even more productivity, both for female and male economists. Third, findings 
from ten fields are varied. For Macroeconomics, Financial Economics, Public Economics 
and Econometrics, gender, extent of specialization and productivity are related in the 
expected direction, but not significantly. For Microeconomics Theory, Trade and 
Development, IO/Business Economics, Labor and Consumer Economics, Resource and 
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Agricultural Economics and Economic History and Thought, extent of specialization 
proves to be a critical variable, although total effect of gender’s direct and indirect effect 
on productivity is not all the same and sometimes even opposite in some fields. 
In the future, further investigations of disposition characteristics of female and male 
scholars might help to reveal why females tend to specialize different from male even when 
they work in the same field. Characteristics of specific fields might play an important role 
in explaining why higher degrees of specialization will enhance productivity rates in some 
fields, while decrease it in other fields.  For example, methods used in Econometrics and 
Economic History and Thought to conduct research differ substantially.  
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Table 4.1: Number and Percentage of Publications by Gender and Field 
Field All Female Male 
All 11230 
(100) 
1603 
(14.27) 
9627 
(85.73) 
Labor and Consumer Economics 2361 539 
(22.83)  
1822 
(77.17) 
Macroeconomics 1906 215 
(11.28) 
1691 
(88.72) 
IO/ Business Economics 1250 152 
(12.16) 
1098 
(87.64) 
Microeconomic Theory 1176 123 
(10.46) 
1053 
(89.54) 
Trade and Development 1088 152 
(13.97) 
936 
(86.03) 
Public Economics 1082 
 
107 
(9.89) 
975 
(90.11) 
Econometrics 1080 137 
(12.69) 
943 
(87.31) 
Financial Economics 529 83 
(15.69) 
446 
(84.31) 
Resource and Agricultural Economics 496 36 
(7.26) 
460 
(92.74) 
Economic History and Thought 262 59 
(22.52) 
203 
(77.48) 
Numbers in parenthesis are the percentage of articles published by each gender in each field. Others are the 
number of articles published by each gender.  Fields are presented in order of frequency for all economists. 
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Table 4.2: Average Extent of Specialization of Economists by Cohort: 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004, 
and 2005-2009 
Graduation Year Female Male p-value 
1990-1994 0.77 
(0.08) 
0.80 
(0.08) 
0.17 
1995-1999 0.73 
(0.10) 
0.76 
(0.08) 
0.06 
2000-2004 0.70 
(0.11) 
0.72 
(0.10) 
0.34 
2005-2009 0.61 
(0.19) 
0.64 
(0.14) 
0.15 
1990-2009 0.68 
(0.16) 
0.72 
(0.12) 
<0.0001 
This table presents summary statistics of the Ellison-Glaeser index for the full sample and the difference in 
means for female and male economists computed by each cohort. Values are the unweighted means of the 
indices across female/male economists with at least two such publications.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
Table 4.3: Average Productivity of Economists by Cohort: 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004, 2005-2009 
Graduation Year Female Male p-value 
1990-1994 0.15 
(0.09) 
0.16 
(0.09) 
0.70 
1995-1999 0.13 
(0.07) 
0.15 
(0.07) 
0.16 
2000-2004 0.14 
(0.06) 
0.16 
(0.07) 
0.35 
2005-2009 0.15 
(0.10) 
0.16 
(0.04) 
0.61 
All 0.15 
(0.09) 
0.16 
(0.08) 
0.17 
This table presents summary statistics of QJE Publications for the full sample and the difference in means 
for female and male economists in each cohort adjusted by journal ranking and co-authors.  
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Table 4.4: Average Within-field Specialization of Economists by Gender and Field 
Field Female Male p-value 
Labor and Consumer Economics 0.64 
(0.16) 
0.63 
(0.12) 
0.66 
Macroeconomics 0.65 
(0.16) 
0.64 
(0.16) 
0.03 
IO/ Business Economics 0.58 
(0.21) 
0.65 
(0.16) 
0.05 
Microeconomic Theory 0.68 
(0.17) 
0.76 
(0.14) 
0.01 
Trade and Development 0.52 
(0.21) 
0.60 
(0.20) 
0.02 
Public Economics 0.69 
(0.20) 
0.69 
(0.19) 
0.97 
Econometrics 0.79 
(0.14) 
0.80 
(0.11) 
0.92 
Financial Economics 0.65 
(0.24) 
0.66 
(0.18) 
0.83 
Resource and Agricultural Economics 0.52 
(0.28) 
0.63 
(0.20) 
0.15 
Economic History and Thought 0.42 
(0.28) 
0.53 
(0.26) 
0.10 
All 0.68 
(0.16) 
0.72 
(0.12) 
<0.0001 
This table presents summary statistics of Ellison-Glaeser index for the full sample and the difference in means 
for female and male economists computed by treating publications in a field as the universe. Values are the 
unweighted means of the indices across female/male economists with at least two such publications in one 
of ten fields.  
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Table 4.5: Average Productivity of Economists by Gender and Field 
Field Female Male p-value 
Labor and Consumer Economics 0.16 
(0.14) 
0.14 
(0.10) 
0.40 
Macroeconomics 0.14 
(0.11) 
0.16 
(0.11) 
0.17 
IO/ Business Economics 0.14 
(0.09) 
0.16 
(0.14) 
0.39 
Microeconomic Theory 0.10 
(0.07) 
0.16 
(0.12) 
0.02 
Trade and Development 0.12 
(0.16) 
0.14 
(0.10) 
0.46 
Public Economics 0.13 
(0.20) 
0.14 
(0.13) 
0.68 
Econometrics 0.13 
(0.07) 
0.16 
(0.09) 
0.10 
Financial Economics 0.15 
(0.11) 
0.15 
(0.13) 
0.99 
Resource and Agricultural Economics 0.14 
(0.10) 
0.10 
(0.08) 
0.14 
Economic History and Thought 0.16 
(0.13) 
0.14 
(0.15) 
0.75 
All 0.14 
(0.09) 
0.19 
(0.04) 
0.06 
This table presents summary statistics of QJE Publications for the full sample and the difference in means 
for female and male economists in a field adjusted by journal ranking and co-authors.  
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Table 4.6: Variable Description and Means by Cohort: 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004, 2005-2009 
Variables All 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 
Productivity 
    QJE publications 
0.15 
(0.08) 
0.16 
(0.09) 
0.14 
(0.07) 
0.15 
(0.07) 
0.16 
(0.10) 
Gender 
     Female=1; Male=0 
0.20 
(0.40) 
0.19 
(0.39) 
0.18 
(0.38) 
0.17 
(0.38) 
0.26 
(0.44) 
Specialization 
     Extent of specialization, EG index 
0.72 
(0.13) 
0.79 
(0.08) 
0.76 
(0.08) 
0.71 
(0.10) 
0.63 
(0.16) 
Career age  
     Years since PhD 
13.75 
(5.68) 
22.00 
(1.39) 
16.88 
(1.41) 
12.08 
(1.38) 
7.09 
(1.34) 
Current position rank 
   Assistant=0; Associate=1; Professor=2 
1.17 
(0.78) 
1.72 
(0.52) 
1.67 
(0.51) 
1.18 
(0.61) 
0.40 
(0.56) 
Current employing department 
   RePEc ranking of department prestige 
71.97 
(66.56) 
65.17 
(63.08) 
81.05 
(69.78) 
65.82 
(65.03) 
75.47 
(67.27) 
PhD-granting department 
   RePEc ranking of department prestige 
39.41 
(54.64) 
38.36 
(55.97) 
34.22 
(46.88) 
43.30 
(57.88) 
40.46 
(56.15) 
This table presents summary statistics of the variables used in the path analysis for all sample and different cohosts. Cohorts are grouped by graduation year. Values 
in brackets are standard deviation.  
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Table 4.7: Variable Description and Means by Field 
Variables All EHT EM FE IO/BE LCE MACRO MICRO PE RAE TD 
Productivity 
    QJE productivity 
0.15 
(0.08) 
0.15 
(0.15) 
0.16 
(0.09) 
0.15 
(0.13) 
0.15 
(0.14) 
0.15 
(0.11) 
0.16 
(0.11) 
0.15 
(0.12) 
0.14 
(0.14) 
0.10 
(0.08) 
0.14 
(0.11) 
Gender 
     Female=1; Male=0 
0.20 
(0.40) 
0.23 
(0.42) 
0.16 
(0.36) 
0.16 
(0.37) 
0.15 
(0.35) 
0.20 
(0.40) 
0.18 
(0.36) 
0.14 
(0.34) 
0.13 
(0.34) 
0.11 
(0.31) 
0.19 
(0.39) 
Specialization 
     Extent of specialization, EG index 
0.72 
(0.13) 
0.50 
(0.26) 
0.80 
(0.12) 
0.66 
(0.19) 
0.64 
(0.17) 
0.64 
(0.16) 
0.64 
(0.16) 
0.74 
(0.14) 
0.69 
(0.19) 
0.61 
(0.21) 
0.58 
(0.20) 
Career age  
     Years since PhD 
13.75 
(5.68) 
15.53 
(5.15) 
14.65 
(5.94) 
15.64 
(5.28) 
15.38 
(5.69) 
14.32 
(5.52) 
14.88 
(5.84) 
14.46 
(5.54) 
15.15 
(5.62) 
15.56 
(5.63) 
15.27 
(5.73) 
Current position rank 
 Assistant=0; Associate=1; 
Professor=2 
1.17 
(0.78) 
1.45 
(0.68) 
1.33 
(0.75) 
1.45 
(0.68) 
1.33 
(0.75) 
1.27 
(0.77) 
1.30 
(0.76) 
1.32 
(0.74) 
1.39 
(0.72) 
1.37 
(0.69) 
1.35 
(0.75) 
Current employing department 
   RePEc ranking of department  
prestige 
71.97 
(66.56) 
64.06 
(63.39) 
72.44 
(68.43) 
60.55 
(63.50) 
69.40 
(66.86) 
69.18 
(67.49) 
69.31 
(66.34) 
60.96 
(61.44) 
68.74 
(69.81) 
92.27 
(71.90) 
71.56 
(67.60) 
PhD-granting department 
   RePEc ranking of department 
prestige 
39.41 
(54.64) 
38.12 
(58.89) 
42.52 
(55.76) 
45.43 
(60.21) 
36.92 
(52.86) 
36.93 
(54.36) 
48.83 
(57.26) 
42.30 
(54.65) 
42.57 
(58.87) 
40.73 
(54.33) 
38.33 
(56.65) 
This table presents summary statistics of the variables used in the path analysis for all sample and different fields. Values in the brackets are standard deviation 
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Table 4.8: Model Results by Cohort: 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004, 2005-2009 
 Variables All 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 
Effects on Productivity Gender 
     Female=1; Male=0 
-0.14*** 
(0.05) 
-0.22** 
(0.11) 
-0.17* 
(0.02) 
-0.24*** 
(0.02) 
-0.09 
(0.09) 
Specialization 
     Extent of specialization, EG index 
1.99*** 
(0.15) 
4.44*** 
(0.52) 
2.43*** 
(0.44) 
1.80*** 
(0.32) 
1.46*** 
(0.25) 
Career age  
     Years since PhD 
0.04*** 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.028) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
0.13*** 
(0.03) 
Current position rank 
   Assistant=0; Associate=1; Professor=2 
0.33*** 
(0.04) 
0.24** 
(0.08) 
0.45*** 
(0.08) 
0.25*** 
(0.06) 
0.21*** 
(0.08) 
Current employing department 
   RePEc ranking of department prestige 
-0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0009 
(0.0006) 
-0.0006 
(0.0006) 
-0.002*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0006 
(0.0006) 
PhD-granting department 
   RePEc ranking of department prestige 
0.0004 
(0.0004) 
-0.0007 
(0.0007) 
0.002 
(0.0008) 
0.0003 
(0.0006) 
0.0004 
(0.0007) 
Constant -0.19 
(0.12) 
-0.99 
(0.77) 
0.16 
(0.57) 
0.04 
(0.38) 
-0.52* 
(0.28) 
R Squared 0.54 0.36 0.36 0.33 0.28 
Effects on Specialization Gender 
     Female=1; Male=0 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.03* 
(0.10) 
-0.02 
(0.09) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
Constant 0.72*** 
(0.006) 
0.80*** 
(0.007) 
0.76*** 
(0.007) 
0.72*** 
(0.008) 
0.64*** 
(0.01) 
R Squared 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 
N 699 147 157 188 207 
Chi-square(df) 1386.17(21) 119.54(21) 168.17(21) 162.62(21) 171.39(21) 
AIC 252.85 65.05 91.71 76.35 74.03 
This table presents estimate of the variables used in the path analysis for all sample and different cohosts. Cohorts are grouped by graduation year. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***: difference significant at 0.01 level; **: difference significant at 0.05 level; *: difference significant at 0.1 level. 
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Table 4.9: Model Results by Field: Economic History and Thought, Econometrics, Financial Economics, Industry Organization/ Business Economics 
 Variables All EHT EM FE IO/BE 
Effects on Productivity Gender 
     Female=1; Male=0 
-0.14*** 
(0.05) 
0.06 
(0.16) 
-0.04 
(0.21) 
-0.03 
(0.13) 
0.18 
(0.13) 
Specialization 
     Extent of specialization, EG index 
1.99*** 
(0.15) 
0.08 
(0.24) 
4.42*** 
(0.61) 
0.95*** 
(0.25) 
2.04*** 
(0.27) 
Career age  
     Years since PhD 
0.04*** 
(0.004) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.005 
(0.01) 
0.003 
(0.01) 
Current position rank 
   Assistant=0; Associate=1; Professor=2 
0.33*** 
(0.04) 
-0.08 
(0.12) 
0.42*** 
(0.14) 
-0.004 
(0.09) 
0.11 
(0.08) 
Current employing department 
   RePEc ranking of department prestige 
-0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
PhD-granting department 
   RePEc ranking of department prestige 
0.0004 
(0.0004) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Constant -0.19 
(0.12) 
0.31 
(0.25) 
-2.43*** 
(0.53) 
-0.05 
(0.24) 
-0.73*** 
(0.22) 
R Squared 0.54 0.03 0.34 0.13 0.18 
Effects on Specialization Gender 
     Female=1; Male=0 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.11* 
(0.07) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.07** 
(0.03) 
Constant 0.72*** 
(0.006) 
0.53*** 
(0.03) 
0.80*** 
(0.01) 
0.66*** 
(0.02) 
0.65*** 
(0.01) 
R Squared 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 
N 699 86 134 157 281 
Chi-square(df) 1386.17(21) 78.18(21) 176.89(21) 166.00(21) 268.50(21) 
AIC 252.85 68.07 67.05 90.10 68.14 
This table shows estimate of the variables used in the path analysis for all sample and different fields: Economic History and Thought, Econometrics, Financial 
Economics, Industry Organization/ Business Economics 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***: difference significant at 0.01 level; **: difference significant at 0.05 level; *: difference significant at 0.1 level. 
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Table 4.10: Model Results by Field: Labor and Consumer Economics, Macroeconomics, Microeconomics, Public Economics, Resource and Agriculture 
Economics, Trade and Development 
 Variables LCE MACRO MICRO PE RAE TD 
Effects on Productivity Gender 
     Female=1; Male=0 
0.29*** 
(0.09) 
-0.12 
(0.13) 
-0.04 
(0.15) 
-0.24 
(0.16) 
-0.02 
(0.32) 
-0.14 
(0.14) 
Specialization 
     Extent of specialization, EG index 
3.30*** 
(0.24) 
2.88*** 
(0.29) 
2.83*** 
(0.36) 
2.24*** 
(0.28) 
2.74*** 
(0.44) 
1.66*** 
(0.26) 
Career age  
     Years since PhD 
0.003 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.006 
(0.01) 
0.007 
(0.02) 
-0.001 
(0.01) 
Current position rank 
   Assistant=0; Associate=1; Professor=2 
0.19*** 
(0.07) 
0.19** 
(0.08) 
0.17* 
(0.09) 
0.12 
(0.10) 
0.08 
(0.19) 
0.10 
(0.10) 
Current employing department 
   RePEc ranking of department prestige 
0.001 
(0.0005) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
PhD-granting department 
   RePEc ranking of department prestige 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
Constant -1.27*** 
(0.19) 
-1.01*** 
(0.24) 
-1.67*** 
(0.31) 
-1.11*** 
(0.26) 
-0.92** 
(0.41) 
-0.28 
(0.23) 
R Squared 0.37 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.34 0.18 
Effects on Specialization Gender 
     Female=1; Male=0 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.002 
(0.03) 
-0.07** 
(0.02) 
-0.001 
(0.04) 
-0.11 
(0.07) 
-0.08** 
(0.04) 
Constant 0.63*** 
(0.01) 
0.64*** 
(0.01) 
0.76*** 
(0.01) 
0.69*** 
(0.01) 
0.62*** 
(0.02) 
0.60*** 
(0.02) 
R Squared 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.0001 0.03 0.03 
N 373 278 200 183 83 219 
Chi-square(df) 501.47(21) 371.82(21) 230.08(21) 214.61(21) 125.21(21) 242.01(21) 
AIC 91.94 102.26 74.81 86.41 72.75 86.83 
This table shows estimate of the variables used in the path analysis for all sample and different fields: Labor and Consumer Economics, Macroeconomics, 
Microeconomics, Public Economics, Resource and Agriculture Economics, Trade and Development 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***: difference significant at 0.01 level; **: difference significant at 0.05 level; *: difference significant at 0.1 level. 
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Figure 4.1: Productivity and the extent of specialization for female and male economists 
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This figure graphs the productivity and the extent of specialization for female and male economists every 
three years after graduation across ten fields. I decide to focus on every three year for productivity and extent 
of specialization analysis since the three-year reference period is sufficient to accommodate the time lags 
between research, submission and publication (Kyvik 1990; Fox & Mohapatra 2007). Another reason is some 
departments would conduct pre-tenure evaluation around the third year, and tenure or promotion decisions 
are mostly based on the evaluation of cumulative productivity around the sixth year. For economists who 
earn promotion to full professor, it mostly happens around the twelfth year. It would be nice to examine an 
individual’s productivity at those points. 
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Figure 4.2 Illustration of a simple model of the relationship between gender and productivity
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Figure 4.3 Illustration of a path analysis model of the relationship between gender and productivity
 
64 
 
5 SPECIALIZATION AND ADVANCEMENT FOR ECONOMISTS IN 
ACADEMICS 
5.1 Introduction 
Biennial reports provided by the National Science Foundation (NSF) have 
consistently shown that, since 1982, and through the most recent report (NSF, 2015),  
female scientists continue to be less likely than their male colleagues to be full professors 
and more likely to be assistant professors. 
Fewer female scholars are present in the academy than in the workforce as a whole, 
particularly in the higher levels of academy. Although the number of female scholars hold 
higher position in academics is increasing, gender inequalities still exist. Female scholars 
are still a minority in full professorial positions (Hachen 1988; Spurr 1990; Long et al. 
1993; Martin 1994; Long & Fox 1995; Pergamit & Veum 1999). For example, Mason and 
Goulden (2003) found that, between 1975 and 1998, the proportion of tenured male faculty 
members stayed steady at between 60 and 70%, and the proportion of tenured female 
faculty members stayed steady at between 40 and 50%. 
Studies on the gender difference in careers of scholars grew out of questions as to 
why there seemed to be a smaller proportion of female academic scientists being promoted. 
Since research performance is essential for promotion, this has been one of the most 
frequently investigated areas in which researchers looked for differences that might explain 
women’s lower promotion prospects. Although some studies have found no gender 
differences in publication numbers (Williamson & Cable 2003), most studies have 
suggested that women produce fewer research papers than men across different disciplines, 
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decades and countries (Reskin 1978; Rodgers & Maranto 1989; Long & Fox 1995; Asmar 
1999; Prpić 2002; Stack 2004; Posen et al. 2005; Peñas & Willett 2006). However, even 
after taking publication rates into account, studies still find that women are promoted more 
slowly than men and are significantly less likely to achieve promotion at any stage within 
an academic career (Long et al. 1993; Toren & Moore 1998). This leads to investigations 
into other factors that might be related. 
Personal and structural factors, including prestige of a doctoral institution, family 
roles or work experience, have been investigated for a better understanding of promotion 
processes that might give rise to gender differences in outcomes (Xia & Shauman 1998). 
However, even after controlling for these possibly related factors, men were still more 
likely to be found at higher ranks in academy (Ward 2001).  Rosenfield (1991) noted that 
“The persistent effect of sex even after controls for a number of supposedly relevant 
variables suggests there is still more to learn about the promotion process” (p. 20). 
Specialization has become an important topic in labor economics (Rosen 1983; 
Neal 1998; Acemoglu & Pischke 1999; Cappelli 1999; Autor 2001; Taylor et al. 2006). It 
has also been linked to individual career performance (Booth et al. 2002; Zuckerman et al. 
2003). This research adds to the literature by considering the role of the extent of 
specialization in the promotion process. In addressing this issue, a sample of economists 
from the top 86 US Economics departments was analyzed. The primary focus was to assess 
the extent to which advancement in academia for men and women may be influenced by 
the extent of specialization. The few previous studies have taken into account how 
repeatedly engaging in research on the same substantive topic may benefit a scholar’s 
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career process. One related study is Leahey(2008), which developed a simplified measure 
of the extent of specialization and found that specialization has strong and significant 
effects on the “risk” of receiving tenure. In this study, a more defined measure of 
specialization—the Ellison-Glaeser index—was incorporated into the analysis. Different 
from Leahey’s (2008) simple measure of the extent of specialization, the Ellison-Glaeser 
index is unaffected by the number of papers by an author and by the number and the size 
of the fields used in the breakdown. This research also adds to previous literature by 
explicitly considering the role of the extent of specialization across different cohorts. The 
sample by Leahey (2008) only consisted of PhD recipients in sociology from 1972 to 1976. 
This study includes faculty in Economics who graduated between 1990 and 2006 to 
investigate whether gender difference in promotion or the influence of the extent of 
specialization on the gender gap in the probability of promotion has been changing or 
relatively stable at different decades.  Throughout the analysis, the panel nature of the data 
was used to take individual heterogeneity into account. Two key promotions in academy 
was considered using event history modeling: (a) from tenure-track to tenure status and (b) 
from tenure status to full professorship position. 
Section 5.1 presents data summary. The details of the dependent variable will be 
discussed in section 5.3. Following that, the theoretical model for the analysis will be 
outlined in section 5.4. In section 5.5, an analysis of promotion to tenure status and then to 
full professorship positions for female and male scholars will be presented. Whether 
differences in the extent of specialization contribute to the gender difference in the 
likelihood of advance in academics is analyzed. This section also considers the effect of 
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research specialization across cohorts.  Finally, some general conclusions will be discussed 
in Section 5.5. 
5.2 Data Summary 
Table 5.1 shows the percent of the sample in each category. Compared to male 
economists, a smaller percentage of female economists hold positions as assistant, 
associate and full professors, and the differences are statistically significant. Moreover, the 
percentage of female economists decreases as advancing to higher rank in Economics. 
Female economists are significantly less likely to obtain more prestigious academic 
positions. 
5.3 Dependent Variable 
Units of analysis for this study are person-years at “risk” for a promotion: (a) from 
tenure-track to tenured status and (b) from tenured status to full professorship. I considered 
economists at risk for transition to tenured status while they remain on tenure-track, but 
untenured, positions. Economists at risk for transition to full professorship are those 
remaining in associate professor positions, but not granted full professorship yet. The 
dependent variable has a value of 1 for person-years in which promotion occurred, 
otherwise 0.  
5.4 Empirical Method 
I sought to explain three outcomes: (a) the effect of research specialization on the 
likelihood of promotion from a tenure-track position to a tenured position and its variation 
among different cohorts; (b) the effect of research specialization on the likelihood of 
promotion from tenured position to full professorship and its variation among different 
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cohorts; and (c) the possible gender difference in whether and when previous two 
promotions happen.  
Ever since the seminal work by Long et al. (1993), longitudinal models have been 
frequently used to address the time to promotion differences between male and female 
scholars (Xie & Shauman 2003; Marison et al. 2011; Wolfinger et al. 2008). Longitudinal 
models utilize information from time-varying variables and how their changes over time 
affect the likelihood of promotion to tenure. My analyses are very much an extension of 
those performed by Long et al. (1993) and others. I followed their specifications to apply 
the same functional form for time dependency for both promotions I model. Since 
academic promotions usually take effect between the end of one academic year and the 
beginning of the next, I employed a discrete time event history analysis. This is an ideal 
method for understanding the risk factors associated with an event(Allison 1982; Singer & 
Willett 2003).  
The probability to be promoted to a higher rank should be zero at the beginning of 
the position of assistant/associate professor and peak around six years and then level off. 
Data from this sample show that the mode value of years taken to obtain tenure is seven 
years and the mode value from associate to full professorship is five years. The maximum 
number of years to get tenure is 10 years and the minimum is three years, while the 
maximum number of years to obtain full professorship is also 10 years and the least time 
from associate to full professorship is just one year.  
It is reasonable to assume that, independent of changes in other variables, a 
scholar’s likelihood of promotion will change over time. Although a higher order 
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polynomial in time might catch the changes in the expected probability of promotion over 
time more comprehensively, a second-order polynomial might be sufficient to represent a 
trend of increasing probabilities followed by decreasing probabilities (Leahey 2008). The 
following is the description of the model: 
Let ݐ ൌ 1,2,3…  represent the successive year in a given academic rank. The 
discrete time hazard function, denoted by ௧ܲ , is the conditional probability that an event 
(e.g., promotion to associate professor) occurs in year ݐ, given that it has not occurred prior 
to ݐ. The dependence of ௧ܲ on explanatory variables is assumed to follow a logit model, 
݈݋݃ ቂ ௉೔೟ଵି௉೔೟ቃ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵݕ݁ܽݎ ൅ ߚଶݕ݁ܽݎ
ଶ ൅ ߚଷݔ௜௧ଵ ൅ ⋯൅ ߚ௞ݔ௜௧௞, (1) 
where the subscript ݅ indicates the individual and the subscript ݐ indicates the year in a 
given rank.  The coefficient ߚଵ and ߚଶ capture the change in the baseline of a scholar’s 
probability of promotion over time. ߚଷ …ߚ௞  indicate the effects of the explanatory 
variables on the chance of promotion. Once I get estimates of ߚ௞, I could calculate ௧ܲ by 
the following equation (2):  
௧ܲ ൌ ௘
ഁೖ
ଵା௘ഁೖ       (2) 
5.5 Results 
The results of promotion from a tenure-track position to a tenured position are 
presented first, followed by results of promotion from tenured position to full professorship. 
For each part, I start by presenting descriptive statistics for related variables and examining 
whether there exist gender differences. Then, I analyze the effects of variables on the 
likelihood of promotion, especially the effect of extent of research specialization.  
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5.5.1 Promotion to Tenured Position 
5.5.1.1 Descriptive Description 
Table 5.2 compares means for female and male economists who are on tenure-track 
positions. Following Long et al. (2003), for time-varying variables, values are presented 
for both the year economists have their first publication and the last year in the same rank 
or at the end for observation period. For promotion to tenured professors, the observation 
starts at the first year economists have their first publication, and ends at seventh year of 
graduation. The reason why I chose a seven-year observation period is that evaluations for 
tenure are usually conducted around then, if one accounts for parental leave. Besides, in 
my sample, most economists obtain tenure at their seventh year. I performed analyses for 
a 10-year period; however, results are not significantly different from what I show in the 
following.  
For the whole sample, female and male economists are significantly different in 
non-time varying variables including prestige of PhD-granting institution and current 
employing institution. Female economists graduate from more prestigious departments 
than male economists. However, female economists hold assistant professor positions in 
less prestigious departments compared to male economists. This suggests female 
economists might need more rigorous training to prove their ability. Male economists are 
more likely to move than female economists. At the beginning of their career as assistant 
professors, female and male economists are not distinguished in terms of extent of 
specialization, but they do show significant differences in the year get tenured. Male 
economists have significantly larger numbers of publications and higher quality than 
female economists both at the beginning and the end of their tenure-track position.  
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Comparisons for both gender in different cohorts vary. For the cohort 1990-1994, 
unlike the whole group, female economists move between more institutions than male 
economists. Other variables have the same pattern as the whole group, but the difference 
is only significant for prestige of PhD-granting institution, current employing institution, 
and the first-year quality of publication. For the cohort 1995-1999, female economists have 
a higher level of extent of specialization and quality of publications. The cohorts 2000-
2004 and 2005-2009 show the same results as the whole group.  
5.5.1.2 Estimate the Effect of Extent of Specialization on Promotion to Tenured Position  
Table 5.3 presents the combined sets of independent variables as predictors of 
chances for promotion among tenure-track faculty in economics. I reported the findings on 
the influences of both non-time varying variables and time-varying variables. I focused on 
the extent of research specialization, while, at the same time, referring to other variables 
that are informative. Variables with positive coefficients increase the likelihood of 
obtaining tenure, while variables with negative coefficients decrease the likelihood of 
obtaining tenure.  
Different from Leahey (2008), I find that, just as the descriptive statistics show 
(Table 5.2), the extent of research specialization has a positive effect on promotion to 
tenured position for economists. The effects are significant for the whole sample as well as 
for cohort 1990-1994 and cohort 2005-2009. For the whole sample, holding other variables 
constant, a 0.01 unit increase in the extent of research specialization increases the 
probability of promotion by 10.82%, compared to a 9.91% increase for the cohort 1990-
1994 and an even higher 17.17% increase for the cohort 2005-2009.  
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Coefficients for the variables year in rank and (Years in Rank)2 suggest that the 
increased expected probability of promotion is high at the beginning, but starts to decrease 
after a certain point. This result is statistically significant for all in the sample and consistent 
across all four cohorts, suggesting that it takes time to get tenure in academics, but 
promotions happen within a time frame.  
Female economists have a lower probability of promotion than male economists 
for the whole sample and all cohorts except the cohort 2000-2004. Whether female 
economists are advantaged as the cohort 2000-2004 or disadvantaged as the other three 
cohorts in the promotion processes, neither effect is significant. Although I have found a 
decreasing portion of female economists holding the associate professor position (Table 
5.1), female economists do not have significantly lower or higher probability than male 
economists to be promoted.   
The effects of the department prestige of one’s PhD-granting institution and current 
employing institution are mixed among the whole sample and different cohorts, but none 
of them has a significant effect on one’s “risk” of tenure. The number of previous academic 
appointments decreases the probability to get tenure in that year. As Leahey (2008) showed,  
moving between institutions appears to be detrimental to the chances of tenure, although 
moving to a less prestigious department offsets this decreased chance somewhat. The 
results concerning the effects of productivity, especially the quality of published articles, 
on the risk of tenure are aligned with previous studies: productivity has a strong and 
positive effect on the probability of promotion.  
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5.5.2 Promotion to Full Professorship 
5.5.2.1 Descriptive Description 
The sample consisted of faculty holding the associate or full professor position in 
2014. The observation starts the year they receive tenure until the year they obtain full 
professorship or the end of observation period, which, in this case, is five years. Most full 
professorships were granted in the fifth year after tenure in my sample. Data for a 10-year 
observation are also analyzed, which show similar pattern as the five-year observation.  
Table 5.4 shows that female and male associate professors do not differ 
significantly in the prestige of PhD granting institution, but male associate professors do 
have more prestigious current employing departments. Once tenured, female economists 
are more likely to move between institutions than male economists, but the difference is 
not significant. In the first year as an associate professor, male economists are already more 
specialized and have higher productivity than female economists, and the difference is 
significant until they obtain full professorship.  
Most results for different cohorts are similar to the whole sample group, with a few 
exceptions. For the cohorts 1995-1999 and 2005-2009, female economists have 
significantly less prestigious PhD-granting institution than male economists. For the cohort 
2005-2009, female economists, compared to male economists, even show more prestigious 
current employing institution. Time-varying variables show same difference as the whole 
sample, although not all differences are significant as for the whole sample.  
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5.5.2.2 Estimate of the Effect of Extent of Specialization on Promotion to Full 
Professorship 
Table 5.5 presents coefficients from the event history model for the time to be 
promoted to full professorship starting from the beginning of the associate professor 
position. The same combined sets of non-time-varying variables and time-varying 
variables are included. Coefficients have the same meaning as in previous analyses for 
promotion to a tenured position.  
For the whole sample and all four cohorts, the extent of research specialization has 
a stronger positive effect on the promotion to full professor than previous promotion. For 
the whole sample, holding other variables constant, a 0.01 unit increase in the extent of 
research specialization has the same effect on the chance of promotion as previous 
promotion, which is around 10.24%. The strongest effect appeared in the 1995-1999 cohort, 
wherein a 0.01 unit increase in the extent of research specialization could increase the 
probability by 36.33%.  
Positive coefficients for the variable year in rank and negative coefficient for the 
variable (Years in Rank)2 suggest, in the time structure of promotion, that the probability 
of promotion from associate professor to full professorship increases as time passes, but 
the increase of the probability levels off at some point.  
In the promotion process to full professorship, female economists have a lower 
probability for promotion to full professorship than male economists for the whole sample 
and all cohorts. However, just as with previous promotion to tenured position, a female’s 
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disadvantaged effect is not significant. Gender could not explain why even smaller 
numbers of female economists have full professorship.  
The effects of the departmental prestige of one’s PhD-granting institution and 
current employing institution are mixed among the whole sample and different cohorts. 
The prestige of the current employing institution has a negative effect on the whole sample 
and the cohorts 1990-1994 and 2000-2004. A more prestigious department might have a 
more selective process for full professorship. Contrary to previous studies, such as Long et 
al. (2003), my data show that the prestige of one’s PhD-granting institution has a negative 
effect on one’s promotion to full professorship.  
Different from promotion to tenured position, the number of previous academic 
appointments increases the probability to become full professor in that year. Long et al. 
(2003) pointed out that promotion would be expedited if other institutions attempt to entice 
promising associate professors by using promotion to full professor as an incentive. This 
reason might best explain moving in the promotion to professor. The effects of both 
productivity variables are both strong and significantly for promotion to full professorship. 
5.6 Conclusion 
As shown above, the results of existing studies attempting to understand what 
contributes to the gender difference in the “risk” of getting tenure are inconclusive. Prior 
research generally agrees that productivity in the form of journal publications explains 
success, although other factors, such as institutional characteristics, remain undecided. 
However, even after controlling for related variables, gender differences still exist. Based 
on a sample of US economists in academia, this study has aimed to evaluate how one 
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possible factor, the extent of research specialization, affects female and male scholars’ 
likelihood of promotions in academia differently.  
First, as I expected, the extent of specialization has a positive influence on the 
chance of being promoted. Being more specialized and focusing on a limited number of 
subfields give one an advantage during promotion process. Economists who conduct 
research in several different fields might spread their time too much and consequently may 
not publish as much as required for promotion, especially for promotion to a tenured 
position. Both male and female economists benefit from being more specialized. A more 
diverse research choice is detrimental for advancement in academics. Second, my study 
confirms the effect of journal publications on advancement in academia. Both the number 
of journal articles and the quality of publications improve the likelihood of promotion. 
Third, compared to male economists, female economists are not significantly 
disadvantaged in the promotion process. Perhaps, just as McDowell et al. (2001) show, by 
the late 1980s, promotion likelihood for female economists had been improved a lot. Fourth, 
changing institutions has a positive effect during the process to a tenured position, while a 
negative effect per full professorship. This suggests that changing institutions may be 
governed by different mechanisms. More information about institutional changes and 
organizational practices will provide a better understanding of how they interact with 
individual efforts which create gender difference in promotion prospects.  
Finally, results for different cohorts in both promotion processes vary. The extent 
of research specialization does not always have strong positive effect among all cohorts, 
nor does it have any trends among cohorts. Other variables, such as number of previous 
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academic appointments, may even have the opposite effect on the probability to be 
promoted among cohorts. This suggests that we need a more detailed analysis of individual 
academic careers across generations to understand cohort effect. 
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Table 5.1: Percent of Sample Holding Given Academic Ranks in Top Economics Department in 2014 
Academic Rank Male Female 
Number Percent Number  Percent 
Assistant Professor 109 68.55 50 31.45 
Associate Professor 195 78.31 54 21.69 
Full Professor 240 86.96 36 13.04 
Total Sample (Number) 544  140  
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Table 5.2: Gender Comparison for Variables Used in the Analysis of Promotion to Tenured Position 
This table summarizes means, standard deviations, and difference-of-mean tests for variables used in analysis of promotion to tenured position for the whole sample 
and cohorts 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004 and 2005-2009. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***: difference significant at 0.01 level; **: difference significant at 0.05 level; *: difference significant at 0.1 level.  
  Total Sample 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 
Variable 
 
Year 
in 
Rank 
Male  Female Male  Female Male  Female Male  Female Male  Female 
Non-time Varying 
Prestige of PhD department  2.44 
(1.65) 
*
*
2.32 
(1.49) 
2.48 
(1.72) 
*
*
*
1.95 
(1.33) 
2.29 
(1.48) 
* 2.48 
(1.41) 
2.49 
(1.71) 
 2.42 
(1.74) 
2.50 
(1.65) 
 2.36 
(1.42) 
Prestige of current employing 
department 
 3.40 
(1.69) 
*
*
*
3.77 
(1.56) 
3.34 
(1.67) 
*
*
*
3.99 
(1.48) 
3.67 
(1.75) 
 3.81 
(1.51) 
3.23 
(1.61) 
*
*
3.57 
(1.63) 
3.40 
(1.69) 
*
*
*
3.74 
(1.57) 
Number of previous academic 
appointments 
 0.75 
(0.80) 
*
*
*
0.66 
(0.80) 
1.07 
(0.88) 
 1.15 
(1.07) 
0.95 
(0.86) 
 0.97 
(0.76) 
0.69 
(0.72) 
*
*
*
0.53 
(0.60) 
0.36 
(0.57) 
 0.31 
(0.52) 
Time Varying 
Extent of specialization First 0.15 
(0.29) 
 0.13 
(0.28) 
0.17 
(0.34) 
* 0.17 
(0.32) 
0.14 
(0.30) 
 0.16 
(0.32) 
0.13 
(0.27) 
* 0.05 
(0.17) 
0.15 
(0.28) 
 0.14 
(0.28) 
Last 0.74 
(0.11) 
*
*
*
0.69 
(0.15) 
0.81 
(0.07) 
 0.78 
(0.08) 
0.76 
(0.08) 
 0.74 
(0.11) 
0.72 
(0.10) 
* 0.68 
(0.11) 
0.67 
(0.14) 
* 0.62 
(0.18) 
Number of Articles First 0.42 
(1.12) 
* 0.26 
(0.61) 
0.41 
(0.93) 
 0.22 
(0.42) 
0.37 
(1.03) 
 0.26 
(0.53) 
0.41 
(1.34) 
* 0.13 
(0.43) 
0.49 
(1.11) 
 0.36 
(0.79) 
Last 7.92 
(4.35) 
*
*
*
6.16 
(3.29) 
8.16 
(4.59) 
 7.15 
(3.61) 
8.98 
(4.93) 
* 7.22 
(3.22) 
8.49 
(3.89) 
*
*
*
5.58 
(2.17) 
6.24 
(3.57) 
 5.45 
(3.50) 
Quality of Publications First 0.08 
(0.20) 
* 0.04 
(0.12) 
0.09 
(0.24) 
* 0.03 
(0.10) 
0.06 
(0.19) 
 0.08 
(0.19) 
0.07 
(0.18) 
* 0.03 
(0.08) 
0.09 
(0.21) 
*
*
0.03 
(0.09) 
Last 2.01 
(1.30) 
*
*
*
1.56 
(1.08) 
1.96 
(1.22) 
 1.67 
(1.04) 
2.10 
(1.26) 
 1.89 
(1.31) 
2.32 
(1.33) 
*
*
1.70 
(1.06) 
1.65 
(1.26) 
* 1.27 
(0.93) 
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Table 5.3: Estimation of Variables in Analysis: Promotion to Tenured Position 
Variable All 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 
Years in Rank 2.53*** 
(0.29) 
1.91*** 
(0.45) 
3.90*** 
(0.71) 
2.86*** 
(0.61) 
3.06*** 
(0.82) 
(Years in Rank)2 -0.15*** 
(0.02) 
-0.12*** 
(0.03) 
-0.24*** 
(0.05) 
-0.17*** 
(0.04) 
-0.21*** 
(0.06) 
Gender -0.20 
(0.15) 
-0.16 
(0.30) 
-0.13 
(0.29) 
0.22 
(0.29) 
-0.33 
(0.34) 
Extent of Research 
Specialization 
2.47*** 
(0.53) 
2.39* 
(1.34) 
0.39 
(1.21) 
0.59 
(0.30) 
2.90** 
(1.26) 
Cumulative Publication 
Numbers 
0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.06* 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
0.09** 
(0.04) 
-0.00 
(0.05) 
Cumulative Publication Quality 0.54*** 
(0.07) 
0.50*** 
(0.14) 
0.47*** 
(0.14) 
0.66*** 
(0.14) 
0.88*** 
(0.20) 
Number of Previous Academic 
Appointment 
-0.16** 
(0.07) 
-0.04 
(0.12) 
-0.43 
(0.15) 
-0.60*** 
(0.17) 
-0.15 
(0.24) 
Prestige of PhD-Granting 
Institution 
0.00 
(0.04) 
0.12 
(0.07) 
-0.12 
(0.09) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
0.12 
(0.09) 
Prestige of Current Employing 
Institution 
-0.00 
(0.04) 
-0.21 
(0.08) 
0.02 
(0.08) 
0.08 
(0.09) 
0.15 
(0.11) 
This table presents effects of different non-time-varying and time-varying variables on likelihood of 
promotion to associate professor for the whole sample and cohorts 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004 and 
2005-2009. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***: difference significant at 0.01 level; **: difference significant 
at 0.05 level; *: difference significant at 0.1 level. 
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Table 5.4: Gender Comparison for Variables Used in the Analysis of Promotion to Full Professorship 
This table summarizes means, standard deviations, and difference-of-mean tests for variables used in analysis of promotion to tenured position for the whole sample 
and cohorts 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004 and 2005-2009. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***: difference significant at 0.01 level; **: difference significant at 0.05 level; *: difference significant at 0.1 level.able 
4 Gender Comparison for Variables Used in the Analysis of Promotion to Full Professorship.  
  Total Sample 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 
Variable 
 
Year 
in 
Rank 
Male  Female Male  Female Male  Female Male  Female Male  Female 
 Non-time Varying 
Prestige of PhD department  2.42 
(1.62) 
 2.37 
(1.54) 
2.55 
(1.76) 
*
*
* 
1.90 
(1.38) 
2.20 
(1.37) 
*
*
* 
2.70 
(1.48) 
2.58 
(1.70) 
 2.36 
(1.53) 
2.29 
(1.60) 
* 3.08 
(1.89) 
Prestige of current employing 
department 
 3.50 
(1.73) 
*
*
* 
3.87 
(1.56) 
3.46 
(1.64) 
*
*
* 
4.09 
(1.47) 
3.85 
(1.74) 
 3.86 
(1.50) 
3.24 
(1.67) 
*
*
* 
3.80 
(1.65) 
3.19 
(1.97) 
 3.05 
(1.78) 
Number of previous academic 
appointments 
 0.79 
(0.83) 
 0.85 
(0.90) 
1.01 
(0.87) 
* 1.15 
(1.04) 
0.87 
(0.86) 
 0.97 
(0.79) 
0.57 
(0.70) 
*
* 
0.38 
(0.57) 
0.44 
(0.61) 
 0.45 
(0.85) 
 Time Varying 
Extent of specialization First 0.65 
(0.28) 
* 0.58 
(0.31) 
0.69 
(0.29) 
* 0.54 
(0.36) 
0.65 
(0.28) 
 0.60 
(0.31) 
0.62 
(0.28) 
 0.60 
(0.28) 
0.63 
(0.25) 
 0.58 
(0.28) 
Last 0.77 
(0.09) 
* 0.75 
(0.08) 
0.81 
(0.06) 
 0.79 
(0.06) 
0.78 
(0.07) 
 0.77 
(0.08) 
0.75 
(0.08) 
 0.73 
(0.09) 
0.71 
(0.11) 
 0.70 
(0.08) 
Number of Articles First 7.55 
(4.95) 
*
* 
5.81 
(3.91) 
7.31 
(5.23) 
 5.42 
(4.49) 
8.01 
(5.25) 
 6.26 
(4.15) 
7.57 
(4.64) 
*
* 
5.68 
(3.21) 
6.96 
(4.45) 
 5.83 
(3.88) 
Last 14.48 
(6.81) 
*
*
* 
11.35 
(4.39) 
15.45 
(6.89) 
*
* 
11.67 
(4.76) 
16.30 
(7.28) 
*
* 
13.33 
(4.81) 
13.99 
(6.14) 
*
*
* 
10.16 
(2.97) 
9.60 
(4.44) 
 8.75 
(3.25) 
Quality of Publications First 1.94 
(1.46) 
* 1.51 
(1.32) 
1.75 
(1.33) 
 1.31 
(1.30) 
1.86 
(1.38) 
 1.46 
(1.33) 
2.11 
(1.57) 
 1.68 
(1.30) 
2.07 
(1.61) 
 1.66 
(1.49) 
Last 3.66 
(2.13) 
*
* 
2.96 
(1.88) 
3.77 
(2.28) 
* 3.01 
(1.76) 
3.77 
(2.02) 
 3.24 
(2.00) 
3.82 
(2.13) 
* 2.99 
(2.00) 
2.78 
(1.89) 
 2.22 
(1.62) 
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Table 5.5: Estimation of Variables in Analysis: Promotion to Full Professorship 
Variable Whole 
Sample 
1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 
Years in Rank 0.84*** 
(0.14) 
0.89*** 
(0.23) 
1.38*** 
(0.30) 
0.40 
(0.31) 
0.02 
(1.69) 
(Years in Rank)2 -0.05*** 
(0.01) 
-0.06*** 
(0.02) 
-0.09*** 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
0.07 
(0.28) 
Gender -0.35 
(0.21) 
-0.43 
(0.35) 
-0.34 
(0.34) 
-0.07 
(0.44) 
-13.21 
(251.5 
Extent of Research Specialization 2.42** 
(0.99) 
2.84 
(1.95) 
3.62* 
(1.91) 
1.09 
(1.63) 
4.26 
(5.12) 
Cumulative Publication Numbers 0.04** 
(0.01) 
0.06*** 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.61 
(0.40) 
Cumulative Publication Quality 0.12** 
(0.05) 
0.00 
(0.07) 
0.43*** 
(0.09) 
0.17 
(0.11) 
1.52 
(0.84) 
Number of Previous Academic 
Appointment 
0.22*** 
(0.08) 
0.22* 
(0.12) 
-0.09 
(0.08) 
0.45** 
(0.20) 
1.83 
(1.23) 
Prestige of PhD-Granting 
Institution 
-0.10* 
(0.05) 
-0.03 
(0.07) 
-0.18 
(0.10) 
-0.05 
(0.10) 
0.33 
(0.44) 
Prestige of Current Employing 
Institution 
-0.21*** 
(0.05) 
-0.37*** 
(0.10) 
-0.07 
(0.08) 
-0.25* 
(0.13) 
0.12 
(0.49) 
This table presents the effects of different non-time-varying and time-varying variables on likelihood of 
promotion to full professor for the whole sample and cohorts 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004 and 2005-
2009. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***: difference significant at 0.01 level; **: difference significant 
at 0.05 level; *: difference significant at 0.1 level. 
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APPENDIX 1: Economics Department 
Harvard U, MIT, U CA, Berkeley, Princeton U, U Chicago, Stanford U, NY U, Columbia 
U, Yale U, Boston U, Brown U, U MI, U PA, Dartmouth College, U CA, San Diego, 
Northwestern U, Columbia U, GSB, Boston Col, UCLA, Cornell U, U WI-Madison, U CA, 
Davis, Duke U, Georgetown U, MI State U, NY U, SSB, Vanderbilt U, U MD, U Southern 
CA, PA State U, U CA, Santa Barbara, Rutgers U, U MN, IA State, OH State U, AZ State 
U, U CA, Irvine, U VA, John Hopkins U, GA State U, Washington U, St Louis, U TX, 
Austin, U CA, Santa Cruz, U Washington, U Notre Dame, IN U, George Washington U, 
U CO, Carnegie Mellon U, U IL, Urbana-Champaign, Chapman U, U Southern CA,MSB, 
U Rochester, Williams College, U Pittsburgh, TX A&M U, U OR, Brandeis U, CA Institute 
of Technology, Syracuse U, Clemson U, U WY, U Houston, Tufts U, Purdue U, U CT, U 
AZ, U MS, U CA, Riverside, George Mason U, Fl State U, Rice U, U KY, U DE, Wellesley 
College, U NC, CUNY, U IL, Chicago, SUNY, Albany, U WI, Tulane U, Brigham Young 
U, Southern Methodist U, Appalachian State U, American U, U MI, RSB 
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APPENDIX 2: JEL Codes Aggregation 
 
Economic History & Thought 
A1, A11, A12, A13, A14, A2, A21, A22, A23, B10, B11, B12, B13, B15, B20, B21, 
B22, B23, B25, B31, B32, B40, B41, B52, B53, N00, N01, N10, N11, N12, N13, N14, 
N15, N16, N17, N20, N21, N22, N23, N24, N25, N26, N27, N30, N31, N32, N33, 
N34,N35, N36, N37, N40, N41, N42, N43, N44, N45, N46, N47, N50, N51, N52, 
N53,N54, N55, N56, N57, N60, N61, N62, N63, N64, N65, N66, N70, N71, N72, 
N73,N74, N75, N76, N77, N80, N81, N82, N83, N84, N85, N91, N92, N93, N95, 
P10,P11, P12, P13, P14, P16, P17, P19, P20, P21, P22, P23, P24, P25, P26, P27, 
P28,P30, P31, P32, P33, P34, P35, P36, P37, P42, P43, P44, P46, P48, P51, P52. 
 
Econometrics 
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